Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR, and Data Governance by Voss, W. Gregory
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 29 Number 3 
6-1-2020 
Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR, and Data Governance 
W. Gregory Voss 
Toulouse Business School, g.voss@tbs-education.fr 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Privacy 
Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. Gregory Voss, Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR, and Data Governance, 29 Wash. L. Rev. 485 (2020). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol29/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of 
UW Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jafrank@uw.edu. 
Copyright © 2020 Washington International Law Journal Association 
 
   
 
CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS, THE GDPR, 
AND DATA GOVERNANCE 
W. Gregory Voss† 
Abstract: Today, cross-border data flows are an important component of 
international trade and an element of digital service models. However, they are impeded 
by restrictions on cross-border personal data transfers and data localization legislation. This 
Article focuses primarily on these complexities and on the impact of the new European 
Union (“EU”) legislation on personal data protection—the GDPR. First, this Article 
introduces its discussion of these flows by placing them in their economic and geopolitical 
setting, including a discussion of the results of a lack of international harmonization of law 
in the area. In this framework, rule overlap and rival standards are relevant. Once this 
situation is established, this Article turns to an analysis of the legal measures that have 
filled the gap left by the lack of international regulation and the failure to harmonize law: 
extraterritorial laws in the European Union (regional legislation) and the United States 
(state legislation); and data localization laws in China and Russia. Specific provisions 
restricting cross-border personal data transfers are detailed under EU legislation, as are the 
international agreements that have been invaluable in allowing flows between the United 
States and the European Union to continue—first the Safe Harbor, and now the Privacy 
Shield. Finally, in this context, the role of data governance is investigated, both in the 
context of data controllers’ accountability for the actions of other actors in global supply 
chains under EU law and under the Privacy Shield. Thus, this Article goes beyond the law 
itself, to place requirements in the context of the globalized business world of data flows, 
and to suggest ways that companies may improve their compliance position worldwide. 
Cite as: W. Gregory Voss, Cross-Border Data Flows, the GDPR, and Data Governance, 
29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 485 (2020). 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE ECONOMIC AND GEOPOLITICAL SETTING 
“So, when we start talking about regulation and we start talking 
about GDPR, and we start talking about this extra territorial 
reach where the Europeans are going to find American 
 
† Associate Professor of Business Law, TBS Business School, Toulouse, France. The author would 
like to thank the dedicated editors and staff of the Washington International Law Journal for their helpful 
suggestions and their diligent editing work on this Article, amid a worldwide pandemic, which made a 
discussion of global data supply chains ever more poignant. The author may be contacted at g.voss@tbs-
education.fr. 
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companies and California is going to find Alabama companies. 
The IT folks are recognizing, ‘boy we’ve got some debt.’ I don’t 
know where the data is.”1  
Kris Torgerson, Chief Information Officer at Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory. 
This Article is about cross-border data flows, the impact of EU data 
protection regulation on them, the role of international agreements in this 
context, and resulting requirements for data governance. The structure of this 
Article is as follows: after this introduction, cross-border personal data 
transfer restrictions in EU legislation are discussed, followed by the role of 
international agreements—both in terms of regulating cross-border data flows 
and in allowing an EU “adequacy” determination. This leads to an analysis of 
data governance requirements under the GDPR. Naturally, the relevant 
environment is an international one, with economics2 and geopolitics each 
playing a role; including, issues of “rival standards”3 or, as one academic has 
put it, “transnational regulatory conflict and interdependence”4 and “rule 
overlap” of extraterritorial laws,5 notably between the United States and the 
 
1  Jason Asbury, Maria McClelland, Kris Torgerson, India Vincent, Jennifer Boling, and Amanda 
Sweenty, Law and Business Technology: Cyber Security & Data Privacy Update, 20 TENN. J. BUS. L. 1065, 
1071 (2019), https://trace.tennessee.edu/transactions/vol20/iss4/3. 
2  Julie E. Cohen refers to the economic actors who profit from services provided “via digital 
information and communications networks” having an interest in cross-border data flows: 
 The new information-economy actors that profit from those services—including global platform 
companies and financial services firms but also any firm that engages in offshoring of functions such as 
customer support and human resources—have interests in defining and controlling their own global 
operations in ways that may include transfers of data for processing, cloud storage spanning multiple 
jurisdictions, and cross-border provision of services to end users. Data flows between networked devices—
ranging from personal communications devices to industrial sensors—are central concerns of internet 
governance processes. JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 214–15 (2019). 
3  For a discussion of the “rival standards” aspect of international data privacy legislation, see DANIEL 
W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES 79, 103–06 
(2007) (discussing rival standards as “[d]ifferent groups of countries will generate alternative sets of 
regulatory standards, while trying to weaken the legitimacy of competing standards.”). 
4  Gregory Shaffer speaks of “transnational regulatory conflict and interdependence,” where the 
battlefield is not exclusively international. Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact 
of EU and International Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 4 
(2000) (“The war over privacy standards is fought not just between Europe and the United States. It is a civil 
war as well, fought within the United States itself, with European law changing the balance of power on the 
fields where U.S. interest groups clash.”). 
5  Political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman summarize salient aspects of “rule 
overlap,” in a book that analyzes the local and global political actions of various actors, such as multinational 
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European Union. Authors Farrell and Newman apply their New 
Interdependence Approach (“NIA”) analytic framework “to explain the 
dynamics of world politics in an age of globalization,” focusing on process 
and dynamics in world politics,6 much as Shaffer discusses the process of 
trading up in data privacy standards through the actions of various actors.7 
While these analyses are not at the heart of the Article, they provide 
background and show the dynamic effect of actions of various stakeholders, 
such as governments, trade associations, data privacy advocates, and others, 
which helps explain why international data trade finds itself in the position 
described in this Article, and the implications for data-driven supply chains 
worldwide. First, this introduction will show the growing importance of cross-
border data flows, then discuss the lack of harmonization of data privacy law 
and various divergent regulatory models with strategic effect, and finish 
discussing the Article’s aims.  
A. The Growing Importance of Cross-Border Data Flows 
Cross-border data flows have been described as commerce-enabling 
“hallmarks of 21st century globalization”8 and “the connective tissue holding 
the global economy together.”9 One estimate shows cross-border data flows 
added $2.8 trillion to world GDP in 2014.10 They include personal and 
professional information flows alike, along with flows of digital media 
 
firms, in this context: “Globalization is not characterized primarily by an absence of rules or norms. Rather, 
the process of creating openness—in trade, finance, production and information—creates a series of 
overlapping authority claims made by domestic and international actors. The importance of rule overlap is 
demonstrated by continuing global controversies in policy areas as diverse as antitrust, taxation, bank 
supervision, and data privacy.” See HENRY FARRELL & ABRAHAM L. NEWMAN, OF PRIVACY AND POWER: 
THE TRANSATLANTIC STRUGGLE OVER FREEDOM AND SECURITY 27–28 (2019).  
6  Id. at 26 (especially relevant for the reader is Farrell and Newman’s discussion of political action in 
connection with various issues of data privacy and security rule overlap). 
7  See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 4 (stating that: [I]n order to avoid a trade conflict, U.S. regulators 
promote enhanced data privacy "self-regulation" by businesses. In order to avoid EU data transfer 
restrictions, U.S. businesses implement new internal data privacy practices with an eye on the EU criteria. 
Through the publicity given to the EU Directive, U.S. privacy advocates press for businesses to adopt more 
stringent internal practices and for legislators to enact additional legislation). 
8  MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION: THE NEW ERA OF GLOBAL FLOWS 30 
(March 2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey%20 
Digital/Our%20Insights/Digital%20globalization%20The%20new%20era%20of%20global%20flows/MGI
-Digital-globalization-Full-report.ashx. 
9  MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, GLOBALIZATION IN TRANSITION: THE FUTURE OF TRADE AND 
VALUE CHAINS 25 (January 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Featured%20Insights/ 
Innovation/Globalization%20in%20transition%20The%20future%20of%20trade%20and%20value%20chai
ns/MGI-Globalization%20in%20transition-The-future-of-trade-and-value-chains-Full-report.ashx. 
10  Id. at 74. 
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content.11 Two U.S. government agencies within the U.S. Department of 
Commerce—the Economics and Statistics Administration and the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration—place such flows in 
four categories. Thus, providing more detail although, not specifically 
referring to the personal data that is furnished in order to obtain what they 
describe as a “$0 market price.” These categories are: 
1) Purely non-commercial data traffic, including government 
and military communications; 
2) Transaction data flows between buyers and sellers at a 
market price, including direct purchases between buyers and 
sellers, such as in online banking or advertising, and services 
transactions that involve digital platforms acting as 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers; 
3) Commercial data and services exchanged between or within 
businesses or other related parties at $0 market price, 
including supply chain, personnel, or design information; 
4) Digital data and services delivered to and from end-users at 
$0 market price, including free email, search engine results, 
maps and directions, and information via social media.12 
Moreover, internet intermediaries, who have “captured much of the 
value from the collection of personal data while the data subjects have 
received access”13 to them, provide cross-border “free” digital services, such 
as those within the fourth category above. These services have been estimated 
to have added between $240 billion and $3.2 trillion to trade in services in 
2017.14 Such flows are ubiquitous, and with the Internet of Things (“IoT”) 
there will be huge volumes of international data transfers without human 
 
11  MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION, supra note 8, at 32.  
12  See ECON. & STAT. ADMIN. & NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
MEASURING THE VALUE OF CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS 3 (2016).  
13  W. Gregory Voss, Internet, New Technologies, and Value: Taking Share of Economic Surveillance, 
2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 469, 472 (2017). 
14  The difference between the two figures has been explained as follows: “The lower estimate is based 
on substitute prices, while the higher estimate is based on consumer willingness-to-accept measures. This 
very broad range reflects uncertainty surrounding what consumers would pay for the suite of free digital 
services they consume, and about the business models and bundled services that might emerge if companies 
charged for these services. The reality is likely somewhere between these two figures. Either case, however, 
would represent a sizable addition to global services trade flows.” See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE, 
GLOBALIZATION IN TRANSITION, supra note 9, at 51. 
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intervention.15 They allow small and medium size enterprises (“SMEs”) to 
expand their businesses worldwide and access online digital services that can 
help them increase their productivity.16 However, national (and regional) 
actors have not provided harmonious regulation for these increasing flows, or 
for data privacy, more generally. 
B. Lack of International Legal Harmonization and Divergent Regulatory 
Models with Strategic Effect 
Globalized trade in digital data and services has neither been 
accompanied by a general harmonization of internet law,17 nor true data 
protection and data privacy law convergence, exemplified by the divergence 
between the two large Western blocs: the United States and the European 
Union.18 This divergence exists despite the growing influence of the EU data 
protection model worldwide,19 with its recently applied General Data 
Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).20 Furthermore, in the transatlantic context, 
certain obstacles to data privacy law harmonization exist between the 
European Union, on the regional level, and the United States, on the federal 
level.21  
Transatlantic divergence exists; but, on the international scale there are 
also various legal standards used in Internet governance, arguably for strategic 
ends. China uses regulation, innovation, and foreign policy to gain greater 
power in Internet governance, among other goals. At the same time its citizens 
expect little from the government in terms of privacy; although, perhaps more 
 
15  CHRISTOPER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW 3 (2013). 
16  See JOSHUA P. MELTZER, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERNET AND TRANSATLANTIC DATA FLOWS 
FOR U.S. AND EU TRADE AND INVESTMENT 3, (The Brookings Institution, Global Econ. & Dev. Working 
Paper No. 79, 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/internet-transatlantic-data-
flows-version-2.pdf.  
17  W. Gregory Voss, Obstacles to Transatlantic Harmonization of Data Privacy Law in Context, 2019 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 403, 408 (2019). 
18  Id. at 408. 
19  Id. at 458. 
20  Commission Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. 
(L 119) 1 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR]. 
21  These obstacles have been described as U.S. neoliberalism and laissez-faire policy, lobbying, and 
differing constitutional provisions on one side and the other of the Atlantic. See Voss, Obstacles, supra note 
17, at 431–52. 
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from businesses.22 China seeks the goal of “cyber-sovereignty,” and has 
adopted an Internet regulation model that places an emphasis on national 
interests instead of corporate ones.23 Thus, regulation of the Internet holds 
strategic value.  
Europe, through the adoption of the GDPR, has also taken a strategic 
aim—creating the online trust in digital services necessary to strengthen the 
EU economies24—with legislation that almost seems to take on an evangelistic 
air, as described by Helen Dixon, head of the supervisory authority of 
Ireland,25 where many U.S. Internet giants have their main European Union 
establishment:26  
The EU has opened a new chapter in the history of the Internet, 
creating a blueprint that other states and organizations will study 
closely as they, too, seek to properly balance individuals’ rights 
to data protection with their other rights and with the legitimate 
interests of business and government. The world’s governments 
must start to converge on laws regarding data protection, ideally 
 
22  Adam Segal, When China Rules the Web: Technology in Service of the State, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-
Oct. 2018, at 10. 
23  Id. at 11–12. 
24  Helen Dixon, Regulate to Liberate: Can Europe Save the Internet?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2018, 
at 28, 30. 
25  Background, DATA PROT. COMM’N, https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/about/background (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2020). The Data Protection Commission (DPC) is Ireland’s supervisory authority, defined as 
“an independent public authority which is established by a Member State pursuant to Article 51” of the 
GDPR. GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(21). In common parlance, supervisory authorities are sometimes known 
as “data protection authorities” or “DPAs.” The DPC’s structure, with Helen Dixon at its head (as Data 
Protection Commissioner), may be viewed on their website. See Senior Management Committee & 
Organisational Structure, DATA PROT. COMM’N, https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/about/senior-
management-committee-organisational-structure (last visited on Feb. 20, 2020). 
26  Ireland “is the European headquarters for data-hungry companies including Airbnb, Apple, 
Facebook, Google, Twitter and Microsoft, which owns LinkedIn.” Adam Satariano, New Privacy Rules 
Could Make This Woman One of Tech’s Most Important Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2GjRTaN. It is the supervisory authority of the Member State of the main establishment of 
the controller of data processing activities in the European Union that acts as the lead supervisory authority 
for that company. GDPR, supra note 20, art. 56(1). A “controller” is “the natural or legal person, public 
authority, agency or other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of 
the processing of personal data . . . .” GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(7). A controller’s “main establishment” is, 
for these controllers with establishments in more than one EU Member State, “the place of its central 
administration in the [European] Union, unless the decisions on the purposes and means of the processing of 
personal data are taken in another establishment of the controller in the Union and the latter establishment 
has the power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment having taken such 
decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment.” GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(16)(a). Thus, for 
each of the large companies listed in this footnote, the Irish DPC would likely be the lead supervisory 
authority. 
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taking inspiration from the GDPR. Otherwise, authoritarians and 
unscrupulous tech giants will stand to gain, and democratic states 
and ordinary people will lose out.27 
Furthermore, Khorana and Voss describe Europe’s Digital Single 
Market strategy, of which the GDPR is an important element, as being able to 
be “perceived as an integral part of Europe’s ability to exert its market power. 
By externalizing market-related social and economic policies and regulatory 
measures, the EU is inherently competing with other trade partners in 
exporting its standards internationally and in defining international 
standards.”28  
Under the moniker of the “Brussels effect,” Anu Bradford describes the 
European Union as establishing global rules in a range of areas of regulation: 
antitrust, privacy, health protection (with the regulation of chemicals), 
environmental protection, and food safety.29 The area of privacy protection,30 
where Bradford says Europe sets the tone,31 is central for this Article. Bradford 
sees EU law in this area influencing the laws of areas outside its borders, 
except the United States.32 Moreover, despite its differences with U.S. law, 
EU law in the area of privacy impacts U.S. firms’ business practices, through 
lawsuits against them in EU courts,33 or through firms adopting privacy 
policies compliant with EU law,34 or they’re voluntarily signing on to 
principles from international agreements between the EU and the United 
States, such as those of the Safe Harbor Framework for cross-border data 
transfers.35  
In the United States, the early Internet gained substantially—both 
financially and in terms of its regulatory framework—from the U.S. 
government, in particular through government grants and a policy of 
 
27  Dixon, supra note 24, at 28–29. 
28  Sangeeta Khorana & W. Gregory Voss, The Digital Single Market: Move from Traditional to 
Digital?, in HANDBOOK ON THE EU AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 384, 389 (Sangeeta Khorana & María 
García, eds., 2018). 
29  Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 19–35 (2012). 
30  Id. at 22–26.  
31  Id. at 22. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 23. This reach was noted years earlier by Gregory Shaffer, who described the fact that “in a 
globalizing economy, European regulation casts a net wider than Europe.” Shaffer, supra note 4, at 4. 
34  Bradford, supra note 29, at 24. 
35  Id. at 24–25. 
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“openness” for an “open and free Internet.”36 U.S. public policy choices in 
telecommunications regulation and the Section 230 (Communications 
Decency Act) exclusion of internet intermediary liability for third party 
content also helped create the environment for the development of the U.S. 
Internet companies.37 These substantially lowered risk for Silicon Valley in 
terms of possible torts and copyright liability related to such content.38 More 
to the point, historically there has been little regulation of Silicon Valley 
insofar as data privacy is concerned, and privacy torts are of little help in 
protecting personal information.39 Thus, there are considerable differences 
between this laissez-faire approach, the European Union’s emphasis on 
individual rights, and China’s national interest focus.  
While some have seen that there may be regulatory competition causing 
regulation to rise to global standards,40 there has been no harmonization 
between the national law of China, the regional law of the European Union, 
 
36  See Karen Kornbluh, The Internet’s Lost Promise: And How America Can Restore It, FOREIGN AFF., 
Sept./Oct. 2018, at 33. See also ROXANA RADU, NEGOTIATING INTERNET GOVERNANCE 61 (2019) (“In 
addition to sustained funding from DoD and NSF, the development of the Internet in the American context 
was facilitated by the minimal state ideology, dominant at the time. In 1988, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) created the special category of ‘value-added’ services, which left computer-mediated 
information virtually unregulated by the government.”). 
37  The Communications Decency Act (CDA) was initially subject to court review, with the most 
restrictive CDA provisions invalidated, but Section 230 remained, allowing the CDA to have “an immense 
impact . . . [b]y freeing Web platforms from liability for content on their sites uploaded by third parties, the 
Supreme Court ruling not only was a major victory for the tech companies of the dot-com era, but it was a 
massive win for the giant social media platforms yet to come.” MARGARET O’MARA, THE CODE: SILICON 
VALLEY AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICA 330 (2019). See Kornbluh, supra note 36, at 34. See also RADU, 
supra note 36, at 84 (“Being the first country to introduce protections against liability for online platforms, 
the United States established itself as a safe haven for Internet services, attracting the majority of providers. 
An outcome of this favourable legal environment was the growth of Silicon Valley into a prominent hub for 
high-tech innovation.”). 
38  Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 642 (2014).  
39  According to Professor Chander: “U.S. privacy law offers limited constraints for American Internet 
entrepreneurs. The vaunted common law privacy torts are each quite narrow in scope and mostly unavailing 
to web users concerned about protecting personal information. The torts are not well-suited to the typical 
privacy concern with respect to social media, doing little to bar the use of personal information for marketing 
or the onward sharing of personal information in unexpected ways. Statutory protections remain quite 
narrow.” Id. at 664–65. 
40  See ANUPAM CHANDER, THE ELECTRONIC SILK ROAD: HOW THE WEB BINDS THE WORLD 
TOGETHER IN COMMERCE 167 (2013). Several years earlier, Gregory Shaffer predicted a ratcheting up of U.S. 
standards as a result of EU legislation. See Shaffer, supra note 4, at 80. (“Yet the U.S.-EU conflict over data 
privacy protection demonstrates that in a globalizing economy, social protection levels are not necessarily 
driven downward in the United States.”) 
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and the federal law of the United States.41 Furthermore, the United States 
views certain types of foreign laws, such as the kinds mentioned above in 
connection with China and the European Union, as barriers or impediments to 
digital trade.42 This might be expected given its laissez-faire policy 
perspective.43 
C. Aims 
International trade in data has grown rapidly in importance—both in 
terms of the amount of data flows and their financial value. As this element of 
globalization has developed, nations have not harmonized their data privacy 
laws, and various divergent models of governance have been adopted with 
strategic effect. The scope of this Article aims to inform companies not only 
of the complexities they will face in the context of cross-border data flows, 
but how data governance requirements and good practices are limited to the 
impact of EU data protection laws and their related international agreements. 
This Article also seeks to encourage companies to see cross-border data flows 
as part of an international personal data supply chain and help them realize 
the importance of managing such supply chain in compliance with data 
protection law.  
 
41  On the lack of harmonization between the United States federal law and that of the European Union, 
see Voss, supra note 17, at 417–27. An earlier study comparing the Chinese regime to that in Europe found 
that, “An assessment of the data protection regime in China would be an impossible task because . . . there is 
none to be found.” Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Data Protection Regime in China, 
DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL POL. 24 (2015) 
https://europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/536472/IPOL_IDA(2015)536472_EN.pdf. But see 
Louise Lucas, China Emerges as Asia’s Surprise Leader on Data Protection, FIN. TIMES (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/e07849b6-59b3-11e8-b8b2-d6ceb45fa9d0 (reporting the words of lawyer 
Richard Bird, saying that China “in some respects is the country that has embraced GDPR most directly—
but in a very Chinese way,” including requiring data localization and having a social credit system based on 
personal data). 
42  These barriers or impediments were classified into the following categories: localization barriers, 
data privacy and protection, intellectual property-related concerns, online censorship, and traditional 
impediments. The European Union is specifically cited under the category of data privacy and protection. 
See Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 1, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N xxi (July 2013), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4415.pdf. 
43  For a discussion of U.S. laissez-faire policy and neoliberalism, see Voss, Obstacles, supra note 17, 
at 432–36. 
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II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES: DATA PRIVACY LAWS WITH 
EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT; DATA LOCALIZATION LAWS 
Nation states and regions have not taken action to create international 
harmonization of data privacy law but have adopted divergent regulatory 
models with strategic effect. The EU and several states have adopted 
legislation that impacts international business and data flows beyond their 
borders. 
A. Data Privacy Laws with Extraterritorial Effect: The GDPR and 
Company 
Data privacy law with extraterritorial application exists and is being 
adopted in different areas of the world. This is the case in Europe with its 
GDPR,44 and in the United States through state legislation. 
1. The Extraterritorial Effect of the GDPR 
In Europe, the EU’s GDPR applies when personal data45 is processed46 
and the material and territorial scope provisions of the GDPR are met. The 
material scope of the GDPR includes the processing of personal data, at least 
in part by automated means or as part of (or intended to form part of) a filing 
 
44  Regarding the GDPR’s extraterritorial effect, see Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, GDPR: 
The End of Google and Facebook or a New Paradigm in Data Privacy?, 25 RICHMOND. J.L. & TECH. no. 1, 
[60]-[63] (2018). 
45  Personal data is defined broadly under the GDPR, as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, and identification number, location 
data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, 
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.” GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(1). Salient is the 
fact that the data subject need not be identified by the data, only identifiable. An example is that of dynamic 
internet protocol (IP) addresses, which may in certain circumstances be considered personal data in the 
European Union, even though they do not directly identify the data subject, but when he or she is identifiable 
through the help of an ISP or a competent authority, for example. See W. Gregory Voss & Kimberly A. 
Houser, Personal Data and the GDPR: Providing a Competitive Advantage for U.S. Companies, 56 AM. 
BUS. L.J. 287, 318–20 (2019). 
46  “Processing” is defined broadly, as well, under the GDPR, as “any operation or set of operations 
which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction.” GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(2). 
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system.47 However, it excludes such processing in the course of activities 
falling outside the scope of EU law,48 such as activities concerning national 
security.49 Nor does it include activities by Member States “when carrying out 
activities in relation to the common foreign and security policy” of the 
European Union.50 In addition, it excludes processing of personal data “by a 
natural person in the course of a purely personal or household activity.”51 
Processing by the competent authorities for the “prevention, investigation, 
detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal 
penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
public security” is covered by a different legal instrument, and is therefore 
excluded from the scope of the GDPR.52 Furthermore, personal data 
processing by EU institutions is covered by a different legislative act and also 
excluded.53 The GDPR affords protection to natural persons “whatever their 
nationality or place of residence” regarding the processing of their personal 
data. However, the processing of personal data concerning legal persons 
“including the name and the form of the legal person and the contact details 
of the legal person” is not covered by the GDPR,54 nor is the personal data of 
deceased persons.55 
Perhaps more strikingly, the territorial scope of the GDPR reaches 
outward. First, the GDPR applies to the processing of personal data “in the 
context of the activities of an establishment of a controller or a processor in 
the [European Union], regardless of whether the processing takes place in the 
[European Union] or not.”56 While the GDPR does define the term “main 
 
47  Id. art. 2(1). A “filing system” is “any structured set of personal data which are accessible according 
to specific criteria, whether centralized, decentralized or dispersed on a functional or geographical basis.” Id. 
art. 4(6). However, “Files or sets of files, as well as their cover pages, which are not structured according to 
specific criteria” fall out of the GDPR’s scope. Id. recital (15). 
48  Id. art. 2(2)(a). 
49  Id. recital (16). 
50  Id. art. 2(2)(b), recital (16). 
51  Id. art. 2(2)(c). This is the case for processing which is not connected to a professional or commercial 
activity and such processing could include “correspondence and the holding of addresses, or social 
networking and online activity undertaken within the content of such activities.” However, the professional 
or commercial organizations providing the means for such processing would be covered by the GDPR. Id. 
recital (18). 
52  Id. art. 2(2)(d). That legislative instrument is Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council. Id. recital (19). 
53  Such other legislative act is Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001. Id. art. 2(3). 
54  Id. recital (14). 
55  Id. recital (27) (“This Regulation does not apply to the personal data of deceased persons. Member 
States may provide for rules regarding the processing of personal data of deceased persons.”). 
56 Id. art. 3(1). 
496 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 3 
 
establishment,”57 it does not define the term “establishment” itself, although 
the recitals give some help. There, an establishment is described as implying 
“the effective and real exercise of activity through stable arrangements. The 
legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary 
with a legal personality, is not the determining factor in that respect.”58 Taking 
a key from the recitals, Voss and Woodcock describe the term “establishment” 
as referring “to place where a controller conducts the ‘effective and real 
exercise of activities,’ and has ‘human and technical resources necessary’ in 
order to achieve certain services through ‘stable arrangements.’”59 
Furthermore, case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(“CJEU”) may prove instructive to interpret the part of this provision 
requiring a determination of whether or not an establishment in the EU is 
involved, even when the caselaw was rendered under the GDPR’s 
predecessor, the 1995 Directive. However, to determine whether the 
processing is done in connection with the activities of such an establishment 
or not, a case-by-case analysis is necessary.60  
As an example, one case rendered under the 1995 Directive provides a 
sense of the direction of decisions on this concept of an establishment. In the 
now-famous Google Spain case,61 a complaint was brought by Mario Costeja 
González before the Spanish supervisory authority in order to obtain the 
removal of web pages by the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia related to the 
forced sale of real estate to satisfy social security debts some years prior to 
the case. In addition, he sought delisting of search engine results including 
 
57 Id. art. 4(16) (for a controller with establishments in more than one EU Member State, “the place of 
its central administration in the [European] Union, unless the decisions and the purposes and means of the 
processing of personal data are taken in another establishment of the controller in the [European] Union and 
the latter establishment has the power to have such decisions implemented, in which case the establishment 
having taken such decisions is to be considered to be the main establishment”). 
58  Id. recital (22) (“Establishment implies the effective and real exercise of activity through stable 
arrangements. The legal form of such arrangements, whether through a branch or a subsidiary with a legal 
personality, is not the determining factor in that respect.”). 
59  See W. GREGORY VOSS & KATHERINE WOODCOCK, NAVIGATING EU PRIVACY AND DATA 
PROTECTION LAWS 224 (2016) (while Voss and Woodcock were referring to the 1995 Directive, the same 
meaning would apply to term “establishment” as used in the GDPR). 
60  See Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Article 3. Territorial scope, in THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION 
REGULATION(GDPR): A COMMENTARY 74, 87 (Christopher Kuner et al. eds., 2020). The EPDB has also 
provided examples analyzing different cases under Article 3(1). See Guidelines 3/2018 on the Territorial 
Scope of the GDPR (Article 3), EUR. DATA PROT. BD. 5-13 (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/Files/files/file1/edpb_guidelines_3_2018_territorial_scope_after_public_c
onsultation_en_1.pdf [hereinafter Guidelines 3/2018]. 
61  Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencía Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 
317. 
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such pages from the Google search engine.62 In that case, the CJEU 
determined that Google Spain SL was the establishment of Google Inc. in 
Spain. The court also found that the U.S. company was subject to the 1995 
Directive because the activities of its Spanish establishment—including the 
advertising—helped finance the U.S. company’s search engine.63 Referring to 
the later Weltimmo case,64 the European Data Protection Board (“EDPB”) 
summarized the CJEU’s ruling “that the notion of establishment extends to 
any real and effective activity—even a minimal one—exercised through 
stable arrangements” where the threshold for “stable arrangements” is quite 
low.65 
Next, and perhaps even more remarkably, the GDPR applies to certain 
companies, even if they do not have an establishment in the European Union. 
Article 3(2) provides as follows: 
This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data 
subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not 
established in the Union, where the processing activities are 
related to: 
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a 
payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in 
the Union; or 
(b) the monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes 
place within the Union.66 
Furthermore, if the controller is established in the European Union, but 
an EU Member State’s law applies through public international law, the GDPR 
will apply as well.67 Where a controller or a processor does not have an 
 
62  See W. Gregory Voss, The Right to Be Forgotten in the European Union: Enforcement in the Court 
of Justice and Amendment to the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation, 18(1) J. INTERNET L. 3, 3–
4 (2014). 
63  Id. at 4. Note that the “SL” in the name of Google’s establishment Google Spain SL refers to its 
corporate form—sociedad limitada. See Mercantile Registry Regulations art. 177(1) (B.O.E. 1996, 184) 
(Spain). The sociedad limitada is one of the two most popular forms of commercial companies in Spain for 
business ventures, together with the sociedad anónima. TERESA RODRÍGUEZ DE LAS HERAS BALLELL, 
INTRODUCTION TO SPANISH PRIVATE LAW: FACING THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES 106 (2010). 
64  Case C-230/14, Weltimmo s.r.o. v Nemzeti Adatvédelmi és Információszabadság Hatóság, 2015 
E.C.R. 639 
65  Guidelines 3/2018, supra note 60, at 6.  
66  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 3(2). 
67  Id. art. 3(3). 
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establishment in the European Union, but is subject to the GDPR by virtue of 
Article 3(2), the controller or processor must designate in writing a 
representative in the European Union,68 unless an exception applies.69 This 
representative must be established in one of the Member States where the data 
subjects whose data are processed are located.70 Data subjects and supervisory 
authorities may address this representative either in addition to, or in the place 
of, the controller or processor.71  
Exceptions are provided where processing is occasional and does not 
include large-scale processing of sensitive data (i.e., special categories of 
data) or data relating to criminal offenses, and “is unlikely to result in a risk 
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons, taking into account the nature, 
context, scope and purposes of the processing,”72 or where the controller or 
processor is a public authority or body.73 
However, the European Union is not the only jurisdiction with data 
protection law that has an extraterritorial effect. This Article next looks at 
current and proposed U.S. state legislation with extraterritorial effect. 
2. The Extraterritorial Effect of New and Proposed U.S. State 
Legislation 
This Articles examines new and proposed U.S. state legislation with 
extraterritorial effect, by looking at the California Consumer Privacy Act and 
the proposed Washington Privacy Act. 
a. California Consumer Privacy Act 
In 2018, California adopted its California Consumer Privacy Act 
(“CCPA”).74 The law has been described as a first step to giving California 
 
68  Id. art. 27(1). 
69  Id. art. 27(2) (this would be the case where processing is only occasional and does not include large 
scale processing of sensitive data or data concerning criminal convictions and offenses, and “is unlikely to 
result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons . . . ,” or where the controller or processor is a 
public authority or body). 
70  Id. art. 27(3) (“The representative shall be established in one of the Member States where the data 
subjects, whose personal data are processed in relation to the offering of goods or services to them, or whose 
behaviour is monitored, are.”). 
71  Id. art. 27(4). 
72  Id. art. 27(2)(a). 
73  Id. art. 27(2)(b). 
74  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100–.199 (2020). 
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consumers rights similar to those of Europeans.75 CCPA applies to many 
businesses without a California physical presence, so long as they meet certain 
thresholds and are doing business in that state (which can include businesses 
that only transact business by Internet), and may be said to have 
extraterritorial effect.76 The definition of “business” includes legal entities that 
operate “for profit” and that either collect consumers’ personal information 
(as broadly defined under the CCPA), or have such information collected on 
their behalf where they alone or jointly determine the purposes and means of 
the processing of such information.77 Businesses must meet one or more of 
the following thresholds for the CCPA to apply: 
a) Has annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million 
dollars ($25,000,000), as adjusted pursuant to paragraph 
(5) of subdivision (a) of Section 1798.185. 
b) Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the 
business’s commercial purposes, sells, or shares for 
commercial purposes, alone or in combination, the 
personal information of 50,000 or more consumers, 
households, or devices. 
 
75  See Stéphanie Le Stujon, Le California Privacy Act : premier pas vers un RGPD américain?, 2020 
REVUE DE L’UNION EUROPÉEN 41, no. 634 (Jan. 6, 2020) (“The Californian text represents the beginning of 
a widespread awareness in the United States of the need to protect individuals’ personal data in the digital 
age. This is a first step in the continuity of the GDPR.”). 
76  See Erin Illman & Paul Temple, California Consumer Privacy Act: What Companies Need to Know, 
75 BUS. LAW. 1637, 1640 (2019/2020). While extraterritorial reach is not a new concept in privacy, the CCPA 
is less explicit about its geographic scope than some other privacy regulations are. For example, the GDPR 
explicitly applies to the processing of personal data in the context of the activities in the European Union, 
whether the processing takes place in the European Union. On the other hand, while the CCPA’s broad 
definition of “business” does not limit a business to its place of incorporation or physical presence, it also 
does not explicitly apply to companies outside California. However, given the definition of “doing business” 
referenced above, the result is that the CCPA will have an extraterritorial impact on companies that have no 
physical presence in California. Id. at 1640-41. One law firm warns its U.K. clients that, “The reach of the 
CCPA extends beyond California and the US; it may apply to businesses based in the UK depending on the 
level of interaction with California residents and their personal information.” John Timmons et al., UK 
Business Exposure to the California Consumer Privacy Act 2018 (“CCPA”), WHITE & CASE (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/uk-business-exposure-california-consumer-privacy-act-2018-
ccpa; see also Lothar Determann, Analysis: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, INT’L ASS’N OF 
PRIVACY PROF. (Jul. 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of-2018/ 
(“As of January 1, 2020, companies around the world will have to comply with additional regulations related 
to processing of personal data of California residents.”). 
77  See Illman & Temple, supra note 76, at 1638–39. The requirement that companies determine the 
purposes and means of the processing nearly tracks the definition of “controller” in the GDPR, replacing 
“personal data” by “consumers’ personal information,” instead. GDPR, supra note 20, art. 4(7). 
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c) Derives 50 percent or more of its annual revenues from 
selling consumers’ personal information.78 
Thus, if at least one of the above thresholds is met, the CCPA will apply 
to the businesses described in this paragraph even if they do not have a 
physical presence in California. 
b. Proposed Washington Privacy Act 
While it is only a bill at this stage, the State of Washington also has a 
proposal for a data privacy law with extraterritorial scope—Second Substitute 
Senate Bill 6281,79 with the short title “Washington Privacy Act.”80 The 
proposed Washington Privacy Act would apply to legal entities that conduct 
business in the State of Washington or that “produce products or services that 
are targeted to residents of Washington”81 provided one or more of the 
following thresholds is met: 
a) During a calendar year, controls or processes personal data 
of one hundred thousand consumers or more; or 
b) Derives over fifty percent of gross revenue from the sale 
of personal data and processes or controls personal data of 
twenty-five thousand consumers or more.82 
It is interesting to note that the GDPR’s influence is cited in the 
legislative findings of the Washington Privacy Act: 
[T]he European Union's general data protection regulation has 
continued to influence data privacy policies and practices of 
those businesses competing in global markets. In the absence of 
federal standards, Washington and other states across the United 
States are analyzing elements of the European Union’s general 
data protection regulation to enact state-based data privacy 
regulatory protections.83 
 
78  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (2020). 
79  Second Substitute S. B. 6281, 66th Leg., 2020 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2020). 
80  Id. § 1. 
81  Id. § 4(1). 
82  Id. § 4(1)(a)–(b). 
83  Id. § 2(3). 
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Thus, European and certain U.S. states have adopted or are adopting 
data privacy law with extraterritorial effect, expanding the reach of their laws 
beyond their shores. U.S. states are being influenced by the GDPR. However, 
further complexity is added by other nations, which have adopted data 
localization laws. 
B. Data Localization Laws 
Taking a different approach, certain other nations are dealing with the 
question of data flows by imposing data localization requirements. This has 
notably been the case with China and Russia. 
1. China’s Cybersecurity Law 
China has imposed a requirement of data storage within its borders on 
companies.84 Reflecting the priority given to data localization in Beijing, 
China’s Cybersecurity Law took effect on June 1, 2017,85 and its Article 37 
provides as follows: 
Critical information infrastructure operators that gather or 
produce personal information or important data during 
operations within the mainland territory of the People’s Republic 
of China, shall store it within mainland China. Where due to 
business requirements it is truly necessary to provide it outside 
the mainland, they shall follow the measures jointly formulated 
by the State cybersecurity and informatization departments and 
the relevant departments of the State Council to conduct a 
security assessment; where laws and administrative regulations 
provide otherwise, follow those provisions.86 
 
84  See Segal, supra note 22, at 12. 
85  Samm Sacks, China’s Cybersecurity Law Takes Effect: What to Expect, LAWFARE (June 1, 2017, 
10:56 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-cybersecurity-law-takes-effect-what-expect. 
86  Rogier Creemers et al., Translation: Cybersecurity Law of the People’s Republic of China (Effective 
June 1, 2017), NEW AMERICA (June 29, 2018), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/ 
digichina/blog/translation-cybersecurity-law-peoples-republic-china/ (This text is from unofficial translation 
of the Chinese Cybersecurity Law, provided by the New America think-tank). 
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Yuxi Wei argues that the adoption of this data localization regulation 
should be taken as an indication that “all foreign companies are required to 
cooperate with Chinese data centers for data storage.”87  
China’s law was proceeded by that of its large Eurasian neighbor—
Russia. 
a. Russia’s Data Localization Law 
Countries other than China have adopted data localization requirements 
for personal data, as well. Notably, Russia has adopted a law requiring that all 
databases storing personal data of Russian citizens be physically situated in 
Russia.88 It provides: 
During personal data collection, inter alia, through the Internet, 
the operator shall ensure that databases located within the 
Russian Federation are used to record, systematize, accumulate, 
store, clarify (update or modify) and retrieve personal data of 
citizens of the Russian Federation, except for cases specified in 
clauses 2, 3, 4, 8 of part 1 of Article 6 of this Federal Law.89 
To a certain extent, the revelations by Edward Snowden of the U.S. 
National Security Agency’s mass surveillance programs motivated calls for 
such requirements,90 in addition to advancing work on the GDPR prior to its 
 
87  See Yuxi Wei, Chinese Data Localization Law: Comprehensive but Ambiguous, HENRY M. 
JACKSON SCH. OF INT’L STUD., U. WASH. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/chinese-data-
localization-law-comprehensive-ambiguous/. 
88  Id. 
89 Federal’nyy zakon No. 242-FZ ot 21 iyulya 2014 g. O vnesenii izmeneniy v nekotoryye 
zakonodatel'nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v chasti, kasayushcheysya obnovleniya poryadka obrabotki 
personal'nykh dannykh v informatsionno-telekommunikatsionnykh setyakh [Federal Law No. 242-FZ of July 
21, 2014 on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in as Much as It Concerns Updating 
the Procedure for Personal Data Processing in Information-Telecommunication Networks], FEDERAL'NYY 
ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law] 2014, No. 242-FZ art. 2 (Rus.). 
90  See W. KUAN HON, DATA LOCALIZATION LAWS AND POLICY: THE EU DATA PROTECTION 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS RESTRICTION THROUGH A CLOUD COMPUTING LENS xii (2017) (“Calls for 
further and tighter data localization laws were spurred particularly by contractor Edward Snowden’s 
revelations in 2013 (‘Snowden’s revelations’) of mass collection and interception, by the US National 
Security Agency (NSA), the UK intelligence agency (GCHQ) and other authorities, of the digital data of 
many countries’ citizens.”). 
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adoption.91 Moreover, W. Kuan Hon refers to the EU personal data transfer 
restriction (in its 1995 Directive version) as being “invoked to regulate 
personal data’s physical location as such rather than to ensure that transferred 
personal data are processed in compliance with substantive [1995 Directive] 
Principles.”92 
C. Conclusion Regarding Legislative Responses 
Legislative responses to the lack of internationally-harmonized data 
privacy law have resulted in differing laws with extraterritorial effect—
notably those of the European Union and California—in addition to data 
localization laws such as those of China and Russia. These legislative 
developments have led to what has been called “the splinternet,” describing 
the trend towards the fragmentation of the internet, and cautioning of the risk 
of economic damage, the hampering of digital innovation, and the restriction 
of free speech.93 This context necessitates a study of recent concerns and risks 
and an analysis of their lessons for business. Foreign regulation and 
geopolitical considerations, sometimes reflecting foreign strategic aims, are 
elements of the geopolitical environment of international cross-border data 
flows. Companies must understand these complexities in order to comply with 
data privacy laws that apply up and down the data flow supply chain. 
Importantly, they must also understand and comply with the EU’s cross-
border personal data transfer restriction and any relevant international 
agreements intended to allow for cross-border data flows. 
III. THE EU’S CROSS-BORDER PERSONAL DATA TRANSFER RESTRICTION 
AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATED TO IT 
Both current and prior EU data protection legislation include a cross-
border restriction to personal data transfer in certain circumstances, although 
the Commission has negotiated international agreements in order to allow data 
to continue to flow. This Section analyzes the restriction on cross-border 
 
91  See W. Gregory Voss, Looking at European Union Data Protection Law Reform through a Different 
Prism: The Proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation Two Years Later, 17(9) J. INTERNET L. 1, 20 
(2014) (“The Snowden disclosures likely had a role in obtaining the LIBE Committee vote in Parliament and 
moving the GDPR forward.”). 
92  Id. at 318. 
93  Lost in the Splinternet, ECONOMIST (Nov. 5, 2016), 
https://www.economist.com/international/2016/11/05/lost-in-the-splinternet.  
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personal data transfer in the EU legislation and international agreements. 
prior. 
A. The Restriction on Cross-Border Transfers of Personal Data in EU 
Legislation 
The precursor EU data protection legislation to the GDPR, EU 
Directive 95/46/EC (the “1995 Directive”),94 sets out dual objectives in its 
first Article: 
1) In accordance with this Directive, Member States shall protect the 
fundamental rights and freedom of natural persons, and in particular 
their right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal data. 
2) Member States shall neither restrict nor prohibit the free flow of 
personal data between Member States for reasons connected with the 
protection afforded under paragraph 1.95 
While the fundamental right focus is listed first, the second objective is 
equally important as targeting the development of the single market in the 
European Union. A new fifth freedom—the free movement of personal 
data96—was set to join the existing four freedoms: the free movement of 
goods, services, capital, and persons.97 The idea was to further increase 
integration of what was the previously known as the common market, 
allowing transfers personal data within that economic space by businesses in 
 
94  1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter 1995 Directive]. 
95  Id. art. 1. The corresponding provisions in the GDPR parallel those of the 1995 Directive, with an 
introductory phrase on the subject matter of the GDPR having been added. They are as follows: “This 
Regulation lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data. This Regulation protects fundamental 
rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data. The free 
movement of personal data within the Union shall be neither restricted nor prohibited for reasons connected 
with the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data.” GDPR, supra note 20, 
art. 1. 
96  See ORLA LYNSKEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EU DATA PROTECTION LAW 50 (2015) (“the EU chose 
to ensure the free flow of data via positive integration by creating a harmonized legal environment, via the 
[1995] Directive, in order to eliminate all disparities which would create obstacles to the free flow of personal 
data”). 
97  See GLORIA GONZÁLEZ FUSTER, THE EMERGENCE OF PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF THE EU 134 (2014) (“The principles of the free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital have always been contemplated as of crucial importance for Community law”). Fuster 
describes the link between the free flow of personal data and these four freedoms, while commenting that, 
“It remains nevertheless unclear whether the free flow (or movement) of data serves the free movement of 
goods, persons, services or capital.” Id. at 135 (citation omitted). 
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connection with activities conducted across national borders, and for scientific 
and other purposes, while harmonizing Member State data protection law,98 
as the 1995 Directive had to be implemented by national legislation. Orla 
Lynskey explains that there was no basis for removing obstacles to the free 
flow of such data in the European treaties, so the European Union chose 
instead to use the basis of improvement of the functioning of the internal 
market for the EU data protection legislation.99  
While the 1995 Directive aimed at allowing personal data to flow freely 
within the boundaries of the European Union, it introduced a cross-border 
personal data transfer restriction on certain transfers to countries outside the 
European Union. It required that the receiving country (called a “third 
country”) ensure “an adequate level of protection” for such personal data.100 
That adequacy of the protection was to be “assessed in the light of all the 
circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or set of data transfer 
operations,” including “the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in 
the third country in question and the professional rules and security measures 
which are complied with in that country.”101  
The transfer restriction was intended to ensure that companies not try 
to avoid the 1995 Directive by engaging in processing operations outside of 
the European Union.102 It had an impact, as several countries modified their 
legislation to attempt to comply with adequacy requirements. But the United 
States encouraged self-regulatory measures instead,103 as is consistent with 
the self-regulatory nature of U.S. federal data privacy policy.104  
 
98  See ORLA LYNSKEY, supra note 96, at 49 (2015) (citation omitted). 
99  Id. at 50. Indeed, Lynskey comments that, “as a result of the EU’s lack of competence to enact 
fundamental rights legislation” the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) “initially emphasized data 
protection’s market integration objective while treating its fundamental rights dimension with caution.” Id. 
at 47.  
100  1995 Directive, supra note 94, art. 25(1). 
101  Id. art. 25(2). 
102  See DREZNER, supra note 3, at 104. 
103  “This threat was proved sufficiently potent for Australia, Canada, and Eastern European countries 
to revise their own laws in an attempt to comply with EU preferences. However, the U.S. response was to 
encourage American multinationals to establish self-regulatory mechanisms that would meet EU standards. 
Sets of voluntary principles, such as those provided by TRUSTe and BBBOnline, were developed.” Id. 
104  See Voss, supra note 17, at 435. 
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The United States was not considered to be ensuring an adequate level 
of protection,105 and the data transfer restriction’s “potentially detrimental 
impact on [U.S.] business interests” was feared. With up to $120 billion in 
trade under threat,106 the European Union and the United States negotiated an 
international agreement, known as the “Safe Harbor” scheme.107 This 
agreement and its successor, the Privacy Shield, are discussed below. 
However, prior to the finalization of the Privacy Shield, the European Union 
adopted the GDPR, which repealed and replaced the 1995 Directive on May 
25, 2018.108 
While the GDPR contains changes from the 1995 Directive, it is more 
an evolution of the law rather than a “radical departure” from the prior 
approach, specifically in the area of transfers of personal data to third 
countries.109 The GDPR sets out the general principle that transfers of personal 
data undergoing processing (or to be processed after transfer), either outside 
of the European Union or to an international organization, comply with the 
GDPR’s Chapter V. The GDPR requires such compliance in order “to ensure 
that the level of protection of natural persons guaranteed by [the GDPR] is not 
undermined.”110 Onward transfers are also subject to this requirement.111 
Although the term “onward transfers” is not defined, it refers to further 
transfers to another country outside of the European Union (or European 
Economic Area), or to another international organization, which are common 
in practice.112 
 
105  See Randi Bessette & Virgina Haufler, Against All Odds: Why There Is No International Information 
Regime, 2 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 69, 81 (2001) (“the United States steadfastly argued that personal information 
transferred to the United States would be adequately protected by industry self-regulation. The European 
Union consistently refused to accept the U.S. system as providing adequate privacy protections under the 
Data Directive. The U.S. negotiators went back to the drawing board a number of times to try to modify their 
proposals while still clinging to self-regulation as the underlying principle for protecting privacy.”). 
106  See Lee A. Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective 194 (2014). 
107  Id. at 195. 
108  GDPR, supra note 20, arts. 94 and 99. 
109  See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, THE EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (GDPR): A 
COMMENTARY 755 (Christopher Kuner et al., eds., 2020). 
110  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 44. This obligation applies to both controllers and processors. It should 
be noted that, unlike the GDPR, the CCPA contains no cross-border transfer restriction. See Illman & Temple, 
supra note 76, at 1646. 
111  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 44 (“. . . including for onward transfers of personal data from the third 
country or international organization to another third country or to another international organization.”). 
112  Kuner, supra note 109, at 763 (“Onward transfers are common in practice, since data are often re-
exported to third parties by a data importer.” An example is the outsourcing of a data base to a data importer 
in a third-party country who then outsources the data base maintenance to another third-party company.”).  
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Transfers may be made on the basis of a European Commission 
adequacy decision, where the Commission has “decided that the third country, 
a territory or one or more specified sectors with that third country, or the 
international organization in question ensures an adequate level of 
protection.”113 Commission adequacy decisions exist for Andorra, Argentina, 
Canada (for commercial organizations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle 
of Man, Japan, Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland, Uruguay, and the United 
States (but solely under the Privacy Shield framework), and adequacy 
discussions are ongoing with South Korea.114 This is a far cry from a majority 
of the total 194 countries of the world, or of the remaining number when 
deduction is made for the Member States of the European Union.115 
For those remaining nations not benefitting from a Commission 
adequacy decision, other grounds must exist for cross-border personal data 
transfers to be made—what the GDPR refers to as “appropriate safeguards.”116 
These appropriate safeguards are intended to “compensate for the lack of data 
protection” in the destination country,117 and may include “a legally binding 
and enforceable instrument between public authorities or bodies,”118 binding 
 
113  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 45(1). An “international organisation” is defined as “an organisation and 
its subordinate bodies governed by public international law, or any other body which is set up by, or on the 
basis of, an agreement between two or more countries.” Id. art. 4(26). The GDPR sets out criteria to be taken 
into account when assessing the adequacy of the level of protection, such as the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, relevant legislation, “including rules for the onward transfer of personal data to another third country 
. . . .” Id. art. 45(2)(a). Furthermore, the existence and functioning of an independent supervisory authority 
and the international commitments in relation to the protection of personal data figure among the criteria. Id. 
art. 45(2)(b)-(c). However, in order to be considered adequate, the level of protection need not be identical 
to that of the European Union, but “essentially equivalent,” instead. See Voss, Obstacles, supra note 17, at 
459. 
114  Adequacy Decisions, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (last visited Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-
decisions_en. 
115  See How Many Countries Are In The World?, WORLDATLAS, 
https://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm (last visited on Feb. 25, 2020) (There are approximately 194 
countries in existence in the world, although measures vary); see also Countries, EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries_en (last visited on Feb. 25, 2020) (Out of this total, the 
total Member States of the European Union—27 after Brexit—must be deducted); Adequacy Decisions, 
supra note 114 (out of approximately 167 nations that would need an adequacy decision in order to allow the 
free flow of personal data of individuals in the European Union to such countries, only those listed above 
have received such a decision). 
116  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 46(1). 
117  Id. recital 108. 
118  Id. art. 46(2)(a). 
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corporate rules (“BCRs”),119 standard data protection clauses adopted by the 
Commission120 or by a supervisory authority and approved by the 
Commission,121 an approved code of conduct122 or an approved certification 
mechanism123 together with “binding and enforceable commitments of the 
controller or processor in the third country to apply the appropriate 
safeguards, including as regards data subjects’ rights.”  
Furthermore, there exist certain “derogations”124 to the cross-border 
personal data transfer restriction contained in the GDPR, when a transfer may 
be made without an adequacy decision or appropriate safeguards. First, a 
derogation is available where the data subject has given explicit informed 
consent to the transfer.125 Alternatively, a derogation may apply when the 
transfer is necessary for one of the following five reasons: (1) “the 
performance of a controller-data subject contract;126 (2) the conclusion or 
performance of a contract “concluded in the interest of the data subject;”127 
(3) “important reasons of public interest;”128 (4) “the establishment, exercise 
or defense of legal claims;”129 or (5) “in order to protect the vital interests of 
 
119  Id. art. 46(2)(b). Binding corporate rules are defined as “personal data protection policies which are 
adhered to by a controller or processor established on the territory of a Member State for transfers or a set of 
transfers of personal data to a controller or processor in one or more third countries within a group of 
undertakings, or group of enterprises engaged in a joint economic activity.” Id. art. 4(20). An enterprise is 
defined as “a natural or legal person engaged in an economic activity, irrespective of its legal form, including 
partnerships or associations regularly engaged in an economic activity.” Id. art. 4(18). Finally, a “group of 
undertakings” means “a controlling undertaking and its controlled undertakings.” Id. art. 4(19). 
120  Id. art. 46(2)(c). These are contractual clauses are entered into by the European Union-located data 
exporter and the data importer in a third country and set out obligations to provide certain personal data 
protections. The text of the clauses is standardized and adopted by the European Commission. See Kuner, 
supra note 109, at 799. 
121  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 46(2)(d). These are similar to the contractual clauses mentioned supra 
note 109. The difference is that they are adopted by a supervisory authority (instead of the Commission), 
followed by an approval of the Commission. 
122  Id. art. 46(2)(e). 
123  Id. art. 46(2)(f). 
124  See F.H.S. BRIDGE, THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE FRENCH-ENGLISH LEGAL DICTIONARY 78 (1994) 
(“Derogation” is a term used in the European Union—even in English—which may be translated from the 
French “dérogation” as “. . . exclusion from the effect of a provision; exemption; . . . exception.”). 
125  The data subject must be informed “of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due 
to the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards.” GDPR, supra note 20, art. 49(1)(a). 
126  This derogation also includes where the transfer is necessary for “the implementation of pre-
contractual measures taken at the data subject’s request.” Id. art. 49(1)(b). 
127  This derogation reads as follows: “the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a 
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and another natural or legal 
person.” Id. art. 49(1)(c). 
128  Id. art. 49(1)(d). 
129  Id. art. 49(1)(e). 
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the data subject or other persons, where the data subject is physically or legally 
incapable of giving consent.”130 Finally, a derogation is available where the 
personal data transfer is from a public register open for consultation, where 
EU or Member State law conditions for consultation are met in the specific 
case.131 There is a final, limited basis for derogation: if no other derogation 
applies and no other basis for transfer (such as an adequacy decision or 
appropriate safeguards) exists. This involves a transfer that is “not repetitive, 
concerns only a limited number of data subjects,” and is necessary for the 
controller’s legitimate interests, “which are not overridden by the interests or 
rights and freedoms of the data subjects.”132 In such case, the controller must, 
inter alia, provide suitable safeguards for the protection of the personal data 
and inform both the supervisory authority and the data subject of the transfer, 
and also inform the data subject as to the legitimate interests in question.133 
The concept of cross-border personal data transfer restrictions is not 
unique to the European Union. For example, the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), an organization that today 
includes most of the EU Member States, the United States, Canada, and other 
advanced and emerging countries134 established the OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD 
Guidelines”).135 These are nonbinding, but influential guidelines that permit 
legitimate restrictions to the free flow of personal data, as shown in the table 
in this Article’s Annex. Legitimate restrictions were also allowed in the 2013 
modernization text of the OECD Guidelines,136 although these have been 
 
130  Id. art. 49(1)(f). 
131  “[T]he transfer is made from a register which according to Union or Member State law is intended 
to provide information to the public and which is open to consultation either by the public in general or by 
any person who can demonstrate a legitimate interest, but only to the extent that the conditions laid down by 
Union or Member State law for consultation are fulfilled in the particular case.” Id. art. 49(1)(g). However, 
the transfer under this derogation shall not involve “the entirety of the personal data or entire categories of 
the personal data contained in the register,” and if the consultation is done by persons “having a legitimate 
interest,” such persons must either request the transfer or be the recipients of the data. Id. art. 49(2). 
132  Id. art. 49(1). 
133  Id. 
134  See Where: Global Reach, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ (last visited on 
Feb. 24, 2020). 
135  OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (1980), 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonald
ata.htm. 
136  The OECD Privacy Framework (2013): Annex: Guidelines governing the protection of privacy and 
transborder flows of personal data, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. (2013), 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd_privacy_framework.pdf. 
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modified from the earlier version of the OECD Guidelines, as also shown in 
the Annex. 
Furthermore, both the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108”)137 and the 
Modernized Convention 108 (“Convention 108+”)138 permit restrictions on 
the cross-border transfer of personal data under certain circumstances. The 
Council of Europe has prepared a comparative table on the corresponding 
texts of Convention 108, with amendments, and those of Convention 108+.139 
However, the United States is a party to neither of these two versions of 
Convention 108,140 although the European Commission has encouraged it to 
become one.141  
Moreover, the Commission negotiated an exemption for data protection 
from the General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”), intended to 
protect it against possible challenges by the United States.142 The relevant 
general exemption of the GATS is as follows: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in 
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, 
 
137  Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
Jan. 28, 1981, ETS No. 108. 
138  Convention 108+, Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://rm.coe.int/convention-108-convention-for-the-protection-of-
individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1 (last visited on May 6, 2020).  
139  Modernisation of Convention 108: Comparative table: Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (CETS 108), COUNCIL OF EUR., https://rm.coe.int/cahdata-
convention-108-table-e-april2018/16808ac958 (last visited on Mar. 4, 2020). 
140 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 108: Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, COUNCIL OF EUR. (status as of Feb. 25, 2020), 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108/signatures?p_auth=2ZBNRLeZ; 
Chart of Signatures and ratifications of Treaty 223: Protocol Amending the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, COUNCIL OF EUR. (status as of Feb. 25, 
2020), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/223/signatures. 
141  See EUR. COMM’N, REPORT FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND TO THE 
COUNCIL ON THE SECOND ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EU-U.S. PRIVACY SHIELD, at 6 
(2018). 
142  See FARRELL & NEWMAN, supra note 5, at 32 (“In order to prevent the trade regime from affecting 
European privacy rules, the European Commission negotiated a privacy exemption from the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, which entered into force in the mid-1990s. This exemption, in turn, stymied 
future U.S. efforts to challenge EU privacy rules as a protectionist barrier to services trade.” (citation 
omitted)).  
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nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the 
adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: . . . (c) 
necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which 
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement 
including those relating to: . . . (ii) the protection of the privacy 
of individuals in relation to the processing and dissemination of 
personal data and the protection of confidentiality of individual 
records and accounts;143 
Various commentators have noted that no case has yet been brought where the 
exemption for data protection has been used as a defense.144 Furthermore, 
when the European Union and the United States were negotiating the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (“TTIP”), data 
protection was seen as a blocking issue, given transatlantic divergence on the 
issue.145 Some may argue that “contrary to popular perception, internet 
security and privacy can promote free flow of data and trade in digital 
services, provided they are consistent and reasonable and promote global, 
interoperable standards.”146 However, the GATS and the proposed TTIP are 
not the only international agreements germane to our discussion of cross-
border data flows. 
B. The Role of International Agreements 
International agreements help ensure the cross-border transfer of 
personal data, as will be shown in this Section. One past international 
agreement affecting transatlantic data flows has already been mentioned in 
this Article: the U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework. The Safe Harbor 
Framework, which one U.S. congresswoman referred to as “a little-known 
 
143  General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XIV (c)(ii), 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm. 
144  See, e.g., Diane A. MacDonald & Christine M. Streatfeild, Personal Data Privacy and the WTO, 36 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 625, 638 (2014) (“The GATS exception for the protection of the privacy of personal data 
has neither been tested by a disputed resolution panel nor attracted much interest in the otherwise lively 
GATS negotiations.” (citation omitted)). See also Joshua D. Blume, Reading the Trade Tea Leaves: A 
Comparative Analysis of Potential United States WTO-GATS Claims Against Privacy, Localization and 
Cybersecurity Laws, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 801, 819 (2018). 
145  See Mira Burri, The Regulation of Data Flows Through Trade Agreements, 48 GEO. J. INT’L L. 407, 
438 (2017) (“[T]he approaches of the U.S. and EU towards the protection of privacy are at this stage hardly 
reconcilable” (citation omitted)). 
146  Neha Mishra, Building Bridges: International Trade Law, Internet Governance, and the Regulation 
of Data Flows, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 463, 501 (2019). 
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trade agreement between the United States and the European Union,”147 
resulted from negotiations between the U.S. Department of Commerce and 
the European Commission in 2000, shortly after the 1995 Directive and its 
cross-border personal data transfer restriction were to be transposed into EU 
Member State national law in 1998.148 
The Safe Harbor involved companies self-certifying to comply with the 
Safe Harbor Framework principles, which would result in their being 
considered to be in compliance with the substance of the 1995 Directive, 
especially insofar as data subject rights are concerned.149 In turn, the 
companies were able to transfer personal data across the Atlantic to the United 
States, which was a country that did not otherwise benefit from an adequacy 
determination. Companies were also subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. 
entities, principally the Federal Trade Commission, in case of violation of the 
company’s undertakings.150 
However, U.S. compliance with the 1995 Directive and the Safe Harbor 
has been described as “uncertain.”151 The FTC failed to be proactive in 
monitoring Safe Harbor compliance prior to 2009, and to enforce it prior to 
2011.152 Early EU reviews of the Safe Harbor raised concerns about non-
compliance and lack of enforcement on the U.S. side, but the FTC and the 
U.S. Department of Commerce did not take any action as a result.153 
In 2013, following the Edward Snowden revelations, which showed 
that several Safe Harbor-certified companies where transferring personal data 
to U.S. authorities, the Commission issued documents aimed at restoring trust 
in EU-U.S. data flows, including certain calls for action targeting both the 
 
147  Anna G. Eshoo, Safe Harbor 2.0, CONGRESSWOMAN ANNA G. ESHOO (Nov. 18, 2015), 
https://eshoo.house.gov/media/op-eds/safe-harbor-20. 
148  See W. Gregory Voss, The Future of Transatlantic Data Flows: Privacy Shield or Bust?, 19(11) J. 
INTERNET L. 8, 9 (May 2016). See also DREZNER, supra note 3, at 104-105. 
149  See Voss, The Future, supra note 148, at 9. 
150  Id. 
151  See DREZNER, supra note 3, at 105. 
152  See Voss, The Future, supra note 148, at 11. See also Chris Connolly & Peter van Dijk, Enforcement 
and Reform of the EU-US Safe Harbor Agreement, in ENFORCING PRIVACY: REGULATORY, LEGAL AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL APPROACHES 261, 277, 278–81 (David Wright & Paul De Hert, eds., 2016) (the authors 
speak of “long periods (2000–2008, 2010–2011 and 2012–2013) with absolutely no enforcement activity). 
153  Id. at 263. 
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United States and the European Union.154 The Snowden revelations in turn 
informed an important case before the CJEU, Schrems I, that would ultimately 
invalidate the Safe Harbor Framework.155 
In Schrems I, Schrems—an Austrian national156—brought a complaint 
against the supervisory authority of Ireland for having rejected a complaint 
against Facebook.157 He based his claim mainly on the Safe Harbor, the 
mechanism under which Facebook’s Irish subsidiary (Facebook Ireland Ltd.) 
would transfer his personal data to the United States.158 There, the U.S. 
authorities would be able to access the data, he claimed, and there would not 
be adequate protection against mass surveillance.159 Facebook Ireland Ltd. 
was the data controller under the 1995 Directive, which gave the Irish 
supervisory authority jurisdiction.160 The case went up to the CJEU, which 
invalidated the Safe Harbor Framework.161 
Now that the Safe Harbor could no longer be used, a new international 
agreement was needed in order to ensure transatlantic cross-border data flows. 
Thousands of companies had to find another basis for adequacy in order to 
ship personal data to the United States.162 Following intense negotiations (and 
re-negotiations)163 the Privacy Shield Framework—a new international 
 
154  Examples of these calls for action include, but are not limited to, quickly adopting the GDPR, 
strengthening the Safe Harbor and having U.S. legislation protect the personal data of those in the European 
Union, and not just U.S. citizens. See VOSS & WOODCOCK, supra note 59, at 70; Eur. Comm’n, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the 
Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, COM (2013) 847 
final (Nov. 27, 2013), 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/com/com_com(2013)0847_/com_com(20
13)0847_en.pdf. 
155  Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data prot. Comm’r (Oct. 6, 2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf 
?celex=62014CJ0362&lang1=en. 
156  Id. ¶ 26. 
157  Id. ¶ 2.  
158  Id. ¶ 67 (in the case, the Safe Harbor is referred to by the number of the Commission’s Safe Harbor 
adequacy decision: Decision 2000/520). 
159  Id. ¶ 28 
160  See Voss, The Future, supra note 148, at 10. 
161  See id. 
162  See id. at 10–11. 
163  See id. at 11–12 (providing a feel for some of this procedure). 
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agreement—was adopted, and an adequacy decision was issued by the 
Commission.164 
Broadly speaking, the Privacy Shield provided additional protections to 
data subjects. These included commitments from U.S. government entities 
buttressing protections such as those of the data protection principles (for 
example, purpose limitation). In addition, the Privacy Shield included 
recourse mechanisms for data subjects, such as arbitration and an 
Ombudsperson, and certain limitations on data retention and onward transfers 
of personal data.165 However, the Privacy Shield is not a compliance 
mechanism for the GDPR, as such. It merely serves as the basis for meeting 
the requirements of the GDPR’s cross-border transfer provisions. It does so 
by providing grounds for considering that Privacy Shield-certified U.S. 
organizations ensure adequate protection to personal data.166  
While the Privacy Shield is one form of appropriate safeguard to the 
cross-border transfer of personal data, it is also subject to control in the form 
of an annual review by the Commission167 and through the courts when 
challenges are made under the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
protection (such as the Schrems I case involving its predecessor, the Safe 
Harbor, discussed above). The Privacy Shield passed its first two annual 
reviews, with certain improvements made to its operations, as noted by the 
 
164  See Commission Implementing Decision of 12 July 2016 Pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the Adequacy of the Protection Provided by the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield and Annexes 1–7, 2016 O.J. (L 207) 1, 1–112, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:32016D1250&from=EN. 
165  W. Gregory Voss, European Union Data Privacy Law Reform: General Data Protection 
Regulation, Privacy Shield, and the Right to Delisting, 72 BUS. LAW. 221, 231–32 (2016). 
166  FAQs – General, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK (last visited on Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=General-FAQs (“Q. Will the Privacy Shield continue to serve as a 
data transfer mechanism under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? . . . It is important to 
note that Privacy Shield is not a GDPR compliance mechanism, but rather is a mechanism that enables 
participating companies to meet the EU requirements for transferring personal data to third countries, 
discussed in Chapter V of the GDPR.”). 
167  The annual review of Privacy Shield Framework takes the form of a “Joint Review Mechanism of 
the Functioning of the Privacy Shield,” described as follows: “The Department of Commerce, the FTC, and 
other agencies, as appropriate, will hold annual meetings with the Commission, interested DPAs, and 
appropriate representatives from the Article 29 Working Party, where the Department will provide updates 
on the Privacy Shield program. The annual meetings will include discussion of current issues related to the 
functioning, implementation, supervision, and enforcement of the Privacy Shield, including referrals received 
by the Department from DPAs, the results of ex officio compliance reviews, and may also include discussion 
of relevant changes of law.” Annex 1 - Letter from Acting Under Secretary for International Trade Ken Hyatt, 
https://seersco.com/law/letter-from-acting-under-secretary-for-international-trade-ken-
hyatt/#%20https://seersco.com/law/category/eu-us-privacy-shield/intro/. 
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Commission, and remaining points open.168 It also made it through its third 
annual review, although the Commission noted several points for 
improvement, including a point regarding onward transfers: 
In the context of its spot-check procedure, the Department of 
Commerce should assess companies’ compliance with the 
Accountability for Onward Transfers Principle, including by 
making use of the possibility provided by the Privacy Shield to 
request a summary or a representative copy of the privacy 
provisions of a contract concluded by a Privacy Shield-certified 
company for the purposes of onward transfer.169 
The Commission requested that the Department of Commerce use its 
powers to obtain information about contracts for the purposes of onward 
transfer. The EDPB followed this up with a call for greater enforcement of the 
Privacy Shield. The EDPB referred to “lack of substantial checks,” 
specifically in the area of onward transfers, in which it seconded the 
Commission’s request and gave background for why it was important: 
Since onward transfers possibly lead to transfers of data outside 
of the jurisdiction of the U.S. and EU authorities with possibly 
no data protection provided by law it is of utmost importance that 
the competent U.S. authorities closely monitor the practical 
implementation of the Privacy Shield’s “Accountability for the 
Onward Transfers Principle”.170 
Thus, there is a push for greater monitoring of onward data transfers, including 
those from the United States to potentially other countries. 
Furthermore, although appropriate safeguards have received an 
adequacy decision by the Commission, this does not guarantee that they will 
 
168  See Kimberly A. Houser & W. Gregory Voss, The European Commission on the Privacy Shield: 
All Bark and No Bite?, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y: TIMELY TECH (Dec. 20, 2018), 
http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/the-european-commission-on-the-privacy-shield-all-bark-and-no-bite/.  
169  Eur. Comm’n, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the 




170  EUR. DATA PROT. BD., EU - U.S. Privacy Shield – Third Annual Joint Review, Nov. 12, 2019, at 5, 
https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/files/file1/edpbprivacyshield3rdannualreport.pdf_en.pdf. 
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be upheld in the courts. This could fragilize certain companies’ bases for 
cross-border personal data transfers to countries not having otherwise 
received an adequacy decision, much in the way the Schrems I case was 
decided. From the start, the Privacy Shield has risked facing challenge,171 and 
in the more recent Schrems II case, the use of standard contract clauses as an 
appropriate safeguard has also come under attack.172 Although the Advocate 
General in that case has weighed in on confirming the validity of standard 
contract clauses,173 his comment is no guarantee that the CJEU will follow. 
Finally, the European Union is seeking to obtain other international 
agreements in the context of the negotiation of trade deals. In January 2019, 
the European Commission issued an adequacy decision for Japan,174 allowing 
transfers of personal data in both directions between the trading partners 
subject to “Supplementary Rules providing for a higher level of protection of 
an individual’s rights and interests regarding the handling of personal data 
received from the EU based on an adequacy decision,” that are “binding on a 
personal information handling business operator that receives personal data 
transferred from the EU.”175 The negotiation of the adequacy decision was 
 
171  See Voss, The Future, supra note 148, at 16. 
172  See Houser & Voss, supra note 168 (“Following the invalidation of the Safe Harbor, Schrems 
reformulated his lawsuit (Schrems II) to object to Facebook’s use of SCCs to transfer personal data to the 
U.S. for reasons similar to those of Schrems I. In April 2018, the Irish High Court transferred the case to the 
ECJ for consideration of eleven questions. The underlying substantive issue is whether the U.S. government’s 
surveillance program violates the right to data protection under the European Charter of Fundamental Human 
Rights.” (citations omitted)). 
173  The Advocate General stated: “I propose that the Court answer the questions for a preliminary ruling 
referred by the High Court, Ireland, as follows: Analysis of the questions for a preliminary ruling has 
disclosed nothing to affect the validity of Commission Decision 2010/87/EU of 5 February 2010 on standard 
contractual clauses for the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries under 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, as amended by Commission 
Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016.” See Case C-311/18, Data Prot. Comm’r v. 
Facebook Ir. Ltd. & Maximilian Schrems, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 1145, ¶ 343 (Dec. 19, 2019), 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62018CC0311&lang1=en&type=TXT&ancre=. Id. ¶ 7 
(Interestingly, in a preface seemingly acknowledging the importance of the future court decision on cross-
border data flows and trade, while also recognizing fundamental rights, the Advocate General prefaced the 
discussion by saying that the analysis would be, “guided by the desire to strike a balance between, on the one 
hand, the need to show a ‘reasonable degree of pragmatism in order to allow interaction with other parts of 
the world’, and, on the other hand, the need to assert the fundamental values recognised in the legal orders 
of the Union and its Member States, and in particular in the Charter.”). 
174  Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2019/419 of 23 January 2019 pursuant to Regulation 
(EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequate protection of personal data by 
Japan under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, 2019 O.J. (L 76) 1, (Mar. 19, 2019), 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019D0419&from=EN.  
175  Id. at 38 (Annex 1 - Supplementary Rules Under the Act on the Protection of Personal Information 
for the Handling of Personal Data Transferred from the EU Based on an Adequacy Decision). 
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linked to trade talks leading to an EU-Japan trade agreement.176 Because of 
the importance of cross-border data flows to the international economy, the 
European Union is extending the reach of its data privacy standards in parallel 
with international trade agreement negotiations. As it earlier indicated was its 
intent “[h]aving completed the EU's data protection rules, the Commission is 
now setting out a strategy on promoting international data protection 
standards.”177  
In deciding which nations to target, the Commission looks at the actual 
or potential commercial relations with the country. This includes: whether a 
free trade agreement exists or is being negotiated with such country, the data 
flows between the European Union and such country, the role the country 
might serve as a model for its region in privacy and data protection, and the 
political relationship with such country.178 In early 2017, the Commission 
indicated its targets for future adequacy agreements were the following: 
The Commission will actively engage with key trading partners 
in East and South-East Asia, starting from Japan and Korea, and, 
depending on progress towards the modernization of its data 
protection laws, with India, and also with countries in Latin 
America and the European neighborhood which have expressed 
an interest in obtaining an “adequacy finding.”179 
Thus, consistent with the concept of rival standards,180 the European 
Union is actively promoting its concept of data protection—including its data 
protection principles for data governance—around the world through 
international trade ties. 
 
176  The European Commission stated, in discussing the adequacy decision: “This arrangement will also 
complement the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement as European companies will benefit from free 
data flows with this key commercial partner, as well as from privileged access to the 127 million Japanese 
consumers. The EU and Japan affirm that, in the digital era, promoting high privacy and personal data 
protection standards and facilitating international trade must and can go hand in hand.” See European 
Commission Press Release IP/18/5433, International data flows: Commission launches the adoption of its 
adequacy decision on Japan (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_18_5433.  
177  European Commission Memoranda MEMO/17/15, Digital Single Market – Communication on 
Exchanging and Protecting Personal Data in a Globalised World Questions and Answers (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_17_15. 
178  Id. 
179  Id. 
180  See Drezner, supra note 3. 
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C. Conclusion Regarding the EU Cross-Border Transfer Restriction and 
International Agreements 
In summary, the European Union has continued the cross-border 
personal data transfer restriction introduced in the 1995 Directive, into the 
GDPR. This provision, without something more, would have braked 
international personal data transfers to the United States and to other nations 
not considered to provide adequate protection for personal data. International 
agreements such as the Privacy Shield and the agreement on an adequacy 
decision (and Supplementary Rules) with Japan permit the Commission to 
establish an adequacy finding. In the cases of the United States and Japan, the 
finding was given in consideration of for guarantees provided by such 
countries (and by companies, under the Privacy Shield) that allow the 
countries to be considered to provide an adequate level of data protection. This 
in turn permits personal data transfers to such countries from the European 
Union under the GDPR. Other agreements and elements of agreements, such 
as BCRs and standard contractual clauses provide the same function. 
Prudence must be exercised in connection with the use of such instruments, 
due to challenges against the Privacy Shield and standard contractual clauses 
in the courts and monitoring of court proceedings must be done. In addition, 
another form of international agreement—contracts—are essential in 
managing the personal data global supply chain, especially in the context of 
onward transfers under the Privacy Shield. We will discuss contracts further 
in our analysis of data governance under the GDPR and the Privacy Shield in 
Part IV. 
IV. DATA GOVERNANCE UNDER THE GDPR AND THE PRIVACY SHIELD 
One definition of “data governance,” described by its author as a 
narrow one, is “a framework which formalizes the roles, functions, and 
procedures within which an organization’s data is well managed and enabled 
as a strategic asset.”181 It is based on processes and requires a thorough 
understanding of a company’s business, the data it holds, and the relationships 
between such data.182 Data governance processes and policies manage data 
 
181  See Barbara L. Cohn, Data Governance: A Quality Imperative in the Era of Big Data, Open Data, 
and Beyond, 10 ISJLP 811, 813 (2015). 
182  Id. at 814. 
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storage, data flows, and erasure of data.183 Sensitive data must be clearly 
identified within the organization and control of their flows ensured.184 Data 
governance involves protecting data, complying with legislation, and 
“leveraging of data protection and legal compliance in order to establish rights 
to data,” according to one lawyer,185 echoing other contributions. Its key 
function is ensuring data availability and data quality.186 Data governance 
regimes may help companies comply with different data privacy law 
regimes.187 This Article begins its discussion of data governance with an 
analysis of requirements under the GDPR, before discussing the situation 
under the Privacy Shield, and then concluding. 
A. Data Governance Under the GDPR 
Under the GDPR, these data governance regimes must provide for 
controls along the data flow supply chain. 
A first step in GDPR compliance may involve mapping personal data 
being processed, establishing processing records, and identifying the types of 
data being processed.188 The GDPR establishes several rules for data 
 
183  See Roland L. Trope & E. Michael Power, Lessons in Data Governance: A Survey of Legal 
Developments in Data Management, Privacy and Security, 61 BUS. LAW. 471, 472 (2005) (calling on 
corporate Directors and Officers to “focus on the ‘data governance’ policies and procedures that manage the 
long-term storage, routine information flows and ultimate disposal” of information assets, and describing 
such data governance as a comprehensive process to keep pace with security and privacy developments, to 
“ensure compliance with statutes, regulations, rules and court orders.”). 
184  See E. Michael Power & Roland L. Trope, The 2006 Survey of Legal Developments in Data 
Management, Privacy, and Information Security: The Continuing Evolution of Data Governance, 62 BUS. 
LAW. 251 (2006) (the authors, writing in an American publication, use the term “sensitive information” 
generally, not as it is defined under either the 1995 Directive or the GDPR, where “special categories of data” 
is the term used, instead. They see the need for identification of such data “to ensure corresponding legal 
obligations to control and protect such information are respected.”). 
185  The Private-Sector Ecosystem of User Data in the Digital Age, 29 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA 
& ENT. L.J. 1099, 1104 (2019) (the lawyer whose 26th Annual IPLJ Symposium Data Governance Regimes 
panel contributions are reported in this part of the article, is Boris Segalis, Partner and Global Vice Chair, 
Cyber/Data/Privacy at Cooley LLP). 
186  See Barbara Engels, Data Governance as the Enabler of the Data Economy, 54 INTERECONOMICS 
216, 217 (2019), 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/334742032_Data_Governance_as_the_Enabler_of_the_Data_Eco
nomy. 
187  Id. at 1105 (relating the contributions of Anthony Ford, Senior Data Privacy Counsel at Medidata 
Solutions, on the same panel: “data governance regimes help to keep companies disciplined and accountable 
by monitoring where data is stored; what the data is being used for; who has access to the data; how many 
copies of the data are kept: and what level of security different data require.” According to Ford, the result 
of this “fastidiousness” is that organizations obtain “the ability to comply with the multitude of different legal 
regimes governing data privacy.”). 
188  See Voss & Houser, supra note 45, at 289. 
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governance, many of which have their origins in the fair information practice 
principles (“FIPPs”)189 that were distilled in a report made by a committee of 
the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973.190 They were 
later incorporated in the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (“OECD Guidelines”).191 The importance 
of the foundational FIPPs cannot be overstated,192 as is the case for their the 
OECD Guidelines variants, which served to influence the development of data 
protection principles incorporated in the 1995 Directive and later the 
GDPR.193 Although the latter instruments add certain data subject rights, such 
as the right to data portability,194 the right to erasure (right to be forgotten),195 
and assigns a greater role to accountability. Globally, these data protection 
principles include the following: data quality, purpose limitation, integrity and 
confidentiality, transparency, rights of the data subject, accountability, and 
lawfulness of processing.196 
The controller has most responsibilities for data protection compliance 
under the GDPR, although that regulation has imposed certain obligations on 
the processor as well. Under the concept of accountability, the controller is to 
“implement appropriate technical and organizational measures to ensure and 
to be able to demonstrate that processing is performed in accordance with” 
the GDPR.197 Approved codes of conduct may be adhered to and used as an 
 
189  See Voss, Obstacles, supra note 17, at 421.  
190  U.S. Dep’t of Health, Education & Welfare, No. (OS) 73-94, Records Computers and the Rights of 
Citizens, Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, (July 1973), 
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf. 
191  OECD Privacy Framework (2013), supra, note 136. 
192  The role of the FIPPs is recognized in the technology sector, as evidenced by the words of Intel 
Corporation staff: 
 Paula Bruening at Intel succinctly captured the importance of the FIPPs when she described them 
as a global “common language of privacy.” The eight OECD FIPPs have been the foundation of privacy law 
for more than forty years, and they lay out a model to think about privacy that is much greater than just 
minimizing the collection and use of data. The FIPPs have proven to be flexible enough to apply to decades 
of technology innovation and are still adaptable to our current environment. 
 See David A. Hoffman & Patricia A. Rimo, It Takes Data to Protect Data, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 546, 555 (Evan Selinger et al., eds., 2018) (citation omitted) (co-author 
David A. Hoffman is Associate General Counsel and Global Privacy Officer at Intel Corporation). 
193  See Voss, Obstacles, supra note 17, at 415. 
194  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 20. 
195  Id. art. 17. 
196  See Voss, Obstacles, supra note 17, at 421-422. 
197  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 24(1). The “appropriate technical and organizational measures” called 
for “should take into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing and the risk to the 
rights and freedoms of natural persons.” Id. recital (74). Further guidance is given as to the kind and the 
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element of evidence of compliance.198 Where a controller uses a processor to 
carry on processing on its behalf, it “shall use only processors providing 
sufficient guarantees to implement appropriate technical and organizational 
measures in such a manner that the processing will meet the requirements of 
[the GDPR] and ensure the protection of the rights of the data subject.”199 
Furthermore, a contract (or “other legal act”) is to govern the processing, 
specifying, inter alia, that the processor “processes the personal data only on 
documented instructions from the controller, including with regard to transfers 
of personal data to a third country or an international organization . . . .”200 If 
the processor engages another processor for carrying out specific processing 
for the controller, it is to enter into a contract containing the same data 
protection obligations as the controller—processor contract.201 Either sort of 
contract may be basis in whole or in part on standard contractual clauses,202 
and must be in writing (including electronic form).203 In the contract, the 
processor should also be required to comply with security and confidentiality 
requirements under data protection law204 (“integrity and confidentiality” is 
the term for the data protection principle under the GDPR205). 
As part of the transparency obligations of the controller, it must inform 
the data subject, among other obligations: (1) of the recipients or categories 
of recipients of the personal data being processed;206 (2) of whether or not it 
intends to transfer the data to a third country or international organization; and 
(3) whether an adequacy decision applies to allow such transfer or subject to 
which appropriate or suitable safeguards they are being transferred and how 
and where to obtain a copy of such safeguards.207 Where personal data is 
 
severity of the risk concerned in recitals (75) and (76), and as to the implementation of the measures, in recital 
(77). 
198  Id. art. 24(3).  
199  Id. art. 28(1). 
200  Id. art. 28(3).  
201  Id. art. 28(4). 
202  Id. art. 28(6) (Commission standard contractual clauses are provided for in art. 28(7); supervisory 
authority standard contractual clauses in art. 28(8)). 
203  Id. art. 28(9). 
204  See VOSS & WOODCOCK, supra note 59, at 89 (the authors, who discuss this in the context of a 
controller-processor contract, also recommend that the contract allow for auditing of the processor’s security 
arrangements). 
205  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 5(1)(f) (“Personal data shall be: processed in a manner that ensures 
appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorized or unlawful processing 
and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organizational measures 
(‘integrity and confidentiality’)”). 
206  Id. art. 13(1)(e). 
207  Id. art. 13(1)(f). 
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obtained by the controller from a third party, the controller must obtain 
information in order to allow it to provide the information required to be 
provided to the data subject.208 This information includes, as an example, the 
source from which the personal data come and whether or not they were 
derived from publicly accessible sources.209  
Importantly, a controller is responsible for responding to a data 
subject’s request to exercise his or her rights under the GDPR, facilitating such 
exercise,210 and providing information regarding action taken in response to 
the data subject request “without undue delay and in any event within one 
month of receipt of the request.”211 If the controller does not take the requested 
action it must inform the data subject of the reasons for this within at the latest 
one month of the request, and provide information about the possibility of 
filing a complaint.212 So long as it is not “manifestly unfounded or excessive,” 
the actions taken following a subject right exercise request should be free of 
charge.213 
In addition to the rights already mentioned in Section IV, these data 
subject rights under the GDPR include: (1) a right of access to the personal 
data;214 (2) a right to rectification of inaccurate personal data and completion 
of incomplete personal data, without undue delay;215 (3) a right to restriction 
of processing in certain circumstances (such as where the accuracy of the data 
is contested or where the processing is unlawful);216 (4) a right to object to 
data processing in certain circumstances (such as at any time, where the data 
are being processed for direct marketing purposes); and, (5) subject to certain 
exceptions, a “right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him 
or her or similarly affects his or her.”217 
 
208  Id. art. 14. 
209  Id. art. 14(2)(f). 
210  Id. art. 12(2). 
211  The GDPR provides that such period may be extended where necessary an additional two months, 
“taking into account the complexity and the number of requests.” In such case, the data subject must be 
informed of the additional time required and the reasons for the delay. Id. art. 12(3). 
212  Such a complaint could be filed with a supervisory authority. Id. art. 12(4). 
213  Id. art. 12(5). 
214  Id. art. 15. 
215  Id. art. 16. 
216  Id. art. 18. 
217  Id. art. 22(1). 
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An important tool for ensuring interoperability of data—and therefore 
data governance—is metadata, which allows for discovery and reuse.218 
Security expert Bruce Schneier describes metadata as “data about data—
information a computer system uses to operate or data that’s a by-product of 
that operation.”219 In responding to data subject requests, and in ensuring 
compliance with data subject requests to exercise their rights, such as the 
“right to be forgotten,”220 metadata helps.221 As discussed by the U.K. 
supervisory authority, in connection with big data where anonymization of 
data is important in order that it no longer be considered personal data, and 
thus no longer covered by the GDPR,222 metadata is a tool to help with data 
subject requests to exercise their rights under that legislation, such as the right 
to access their personal data: 
The existence of the right of access compels organizations to 
practice good data management. They need adequate metadata, 
the ability to query their data to find all the information they have 
on an individual, and knowledge of whether the data they are 
processing has been truly anonymized or whether it can still be 
linked to an individual.223 
 
218  See Barbara L. Cohn, supra note 181, at 821. 
219  See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND 
CONTROL YOUR WORLD 17 (2015). Mayer-Schönberger and Ramge describe the use of metadata to “have 
an efficient way to label and categorize information,” through the use of categories that are “data about data.” 
See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA 
66 (2018). 
220  GDPR, supra note 20, art. 17(1) (“The data subject shall have the right to obtain from the controller 
the erasure of personal data concerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the 
obligation to erase personal data without undue delay where one of the following grounds applies . . . .”). 
221  See Eugenia Politou et al., Forgetting Personal Data and Revoking Consent Under the GDPR: 
Challenges and Proposed Solutions, 4(1) J. CYBERSECURITY 1, 15 (2018) (“. . . metadata-based architecture 
is considered as a useful building block for enabling and supporting the RtbF . . . , metadata alone cannot 
guarantee that entities will abide by specified policies. Nevertheless, it can facilitate their enforcement by 
making them readily accessible . . . .” RtbF is an abbreviation for “Right to be Forgotten.”), 
https://academic.oup.com/cybersecurity/article/4/1/tyy001/4954056. 
222  GDPR, supra note 20, recital (26) (“The principles of data protection should therefore not apply to 
anonymous information, namely information which does not relate to an identified or identifiable natural 
person or to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the data subject is not or no longer 
identifiable. This Regulation does not therefore concern the processing of such anonymous information, 
including for statistical or research purposes.”). 
223  INFO. COMM’R’S OFF. (ICO), BIG DATA, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, MACHINE LEARNING AND DATA 
PROTECTION 46 (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-
data-protection.pdf. 
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 While metadata is one way to help ensure good data governance, 
technologies used by businesses today, such as cloud computing, create 
certain difficulties for compliance. Where cloud providers move data around 
“in response to load and other factors,” the location of data at any specific 
time may not be known.224 This may involve concerns with the cross-border 
transfer restriction if the location is in a country that has not received an 
adequacy decision.225 
The French data protection authority—the CNIL—offered 
recommendations in connection with cloud computing prior to the adoption 
of the GDPR (although these points are still valid today): “Clearly identify the 
data and processing operations that will be passed to Cloud;” “Define your 
own requirements for technical and legal security;” “Carry out a risk analysis 
to identify the security measures essential for the company;” “Identify the 
relevant type of Cloud for the planned processing;” and “Choose a service 
provider offering sufficient guarantees.”226 
Furthermore, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, an 
influential advisory group created under Article 29 of the 1995 Directive227 
(which was replaced by the EDPB under the GDPR228), opined that cloud 
service agreements should indicate where the data is to be processed and by 
whom, in addition to ensuring “effective control over and allocate clear 
responsibility for processing activities.”229 Careful thought must be made 
 
224  See CHRISTOPHER S. YOO & JEAN-FRANÇOIS BLANCHETTE, REGULATING THE CLOUD: POLICY FOR 
COMPUTING INFRASTRUCTURE 186 (2015). 
225 Id. at 155. 
226 Cloud computing: CNIL's recommendations for companies using these new services, CNIL (June 
25, 2012), https://www.cnil.fr/en/cloud-computing-cnils-recommendations-companies-using-these-new-
services. The recommendations may be downloaded directly. See Recommendations for Companies Planning 
to Use Cloud Computing Services, CNIL, 
https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/typo/documentRecommendations_for_companies_planning_to_use_C
loud_computing_services.pdf (last visited on Mar. 20, 2020). Similarly, the United Kingdom’s data 
protection authority—the ICO—published guidance for cloud computing prior to the adoption of the GDPR. 
See Guidance on the Use of Cloud Computing, ICO, https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1540/cloud_computing_guidance_for_organisations. pdf. 
227  1995 Directive, supra note 91, art. 29(1). For a discussion on the role of this group, see FARRELL & 
NEWMAN, supra note 5, at 51 (“Informally, the Article 29 Working Party has become a powerful 
counterweight to firms and governments that skirt or bend European rules, and its opinions carry considerable 
weight with informed elite opinion”). 
228  Eur. Comm’n, Justice & Consumers, The Article 29 Working Party Ceased to Exist as of 25 May 
2018 (June 11, 2018), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/article29/item-detail.cfm?item_id=629492. 
229  See art. 29 Data Protect. Working Pty., Opinion 05/2012 on the Cloud Computing (July 1, 2012), 
WP 196, at 9, https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendations/files/2012/w 
p196_en.pdf. 
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about personal data management when negotiating and drafting the provisions 
of a cloud service contract.230 
The GDPR provides tools for ensuring accountability and compliance, 
which have been detailed elsewhere: requirements for data processing 
registers (with the exception of certain small and medium sized enterprises),231 
requirements for many companies to have data protection officers,232 and 
requirements for high risk processing to be preceded by data protection impact 
assessments233 figure among these. Furthermore, increased sanctions for data 
protection violation, going up to 4% of annual worldwide turnover for 
companies for the most serious violations, provide motivation for 
compliance.234 
B. Data Governance Under the Privacy Shield 
Data governance provisions about onward transfers (as well as the 
accountability provisions of the GDPR), may be understood as elements that 
make data recipients responsible for the actions of actors down the personal 
data global supply chain. Data controllers are subject to the requirement 
generally through the GDPR’s accountability provisions discussed in Section 
A. This is reminiscent of the way that in other sectors, such as corporate social 
responsibility, companies dealing internationally may have to engage in due 
diligence for supply chain management both upstream and downstream.235 In 
particular, in the area of onward transfers, the Privacy Shield sets out 
accountability provisions, whether such onward transfers be to “a third party 
 
230  For a discussion of the content of a cloud service contract, see VOSS & WOODCOCK supra note 59, 
at 190. 
231  See European Union Data Privacy Law Reform, supra note , at 227. 
232  See W. Gregory Voss, Internal Compliance Mechanisms for Firms in the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation, 50 REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS DE L’UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL 783, 806-14 (2016), 
https://ssl.editionsthemis.com/uploaded/revue/article/2269_09-RJTUM-50-3_Voss.pdf. 
233  Id. at 803-806. 
234  See Houser & Voss, supra note 44, at 57. 
235  “Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is increasingly concerned therefore with supply chain 
management and in particular with global supply chain management.” Andrew Millington, Responsibility in 
the Supply Chain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 363 (Andrew Crane 
et al., eds., 2008). As one example from Europe, France adopted a law that requires due diligence with respect 
to not only a company’s activities and those of its subsidiaries, but also those of suppliers and subcontractors 
in the areas of human rights, health and safety, and environmental risks. See Constance Z. Wagner, Evolving 
Norms of Corporate Social Responsibility: Lessons Learned from the European Union Directive on Non-
Financial Reporting, 19 TENN. J. BUS. L. 619, 669 (2018). 
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acting as a controller” or “a third party acting as an agent.”236 In the case of a 
third party acting as a controller, these include requirements of providing 
information to the data subjects (individuals) (which are couched as “notice,” 
and would typically be considered part of “transparency”) and choice,237 
where the data subject is given a right to opt-out of processing and, in the case 
of the processing of special categories of data (sensitive data), where an opt-
in requirement is imposed.238 Furthermore, in the case of a transfer to a 
controller, there must be a contract entered into with such controller setting 
out elements of purpose limitation and requiring that the recipient controller 
provide “the same level of protection as the Principles” and notify the 
organization “if it makes a determination that it can no longer meet this 
obligation,” in which case such controller will either cease processing the data 
or take “other reasonable and appropriate steps to remediate.”239 
In the case of an onward transfer under the Privacy Shield to an agent 
(processor), several conditions must be met by the organization: 
(i) transfer such data only for limited and specified purposes; (ii) 
ascertain that the agent is obligated to provide at least the same 
level of privacy protection as is required by the Principles; (iii) 
take reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that the agent 
effectively processes the personal information transferred in a 
manner consistent with the organization’s obligations under the 
Principles; (iv) require the agent to notify the organization if it 
makes a determination that it can no longer meet its obligation to 
provide the same level of protection as is required by the 
Principles; (v) upon notice, including under (iv), take reasonable 
and appropriate steps to stop and remediate unauthorized 
processing; and (vi) provide a summary or a representative copy 
 
236  3. Accountability for Onward Transfer, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK (last visited on Mar. 5, 
2020), https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=3-Accountability-For-Onward-Transfer. 
237  Id. (“To transfer personal information to a third party acting as a controller, organizations must 
comply with the Notice and Choice Principles.”). The Notice Principle includes requirements as to the 
information that must be furnished to the data subject (individual), listing thirteen categories of information. 
See 1. Notice, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK (last visited on Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=1-NOTICE.  
238  See 2. Choice, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK (last visited on Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=2-CHOICE. 
239  3. Accountability for Onward Transfer, supra note 236. See also 10. Obligatory Contracts for 
Onward Transfers, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK (last visited on Mar. 5, 2020), 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=10-Obligatory-Contracts-for-Onward-Transfers. 
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of the relevant privacy provisions of its contract with that agent 
to the Department upon request.240 
Thus, in the case of onward transfers by an organization that has received 
personal data under the Privacy Shield Framework, there are ongoing 
responsibilities (or accountability)241 for the U.S. organization self-certifying 
under the Privacy Shield. These responsibilities equate to requirements to 
control the personal data supply chain downriver in what may be described as 
personal data global supply chain management. 
Finally, as we have seen, the incorporation of data governance 
provisions similar to those under the 1995 Directive and the GDPR, has 
provided the substance of international agreements entered into in order to 
allow personal data to cross borders, such as the Safe Harbor and the Privacy 
Shield. Indeed, adopting the GDPR standard for data governance may be a 
strategic choice.242 However, the monitoring of legal developments regarding 
legislative instruments with extraterritorial effect from other jurisdictions 
should be done, as such instruments might impact data governance 
requirements, although this Article has focused on the European Union’s 
GDPR. 
C. Conclusion Regarding Data Governance 
Companies that adopt good data governance practices may find that this 
facilitates compliance with various data privacy laws that apply to their global 
data flow supply chain. Mapping data processing and understanding, to the 
extent possible, where their data are, is the first step for companies. 
Companies should follow what have become arguably universal principles—
the FIPPs—in their effort to comply with laws around the world. As the GDPR 
will apply to many international companies, they should heed its 
accountability provisions and assess their global data flow supply chain for 
 
240  Id. 
241  In the case of an onward transfer to a controller, this accountability will be ensured through 
enforcement of the provisions of the mandatory contract discussed above. In the case of an onward transfer 
to a processor (agent), “the U.S. organisation will bear the responsibility to guarantee the protections provided 
under the Principles by exercising its powers of instruction.” See Commission Implementing Decision of 12 
July 2016, supra note 164, at 6 n.31. 
242  See Voss & Houser, supra note 45 at 338 (“U.S. tech companies can leverage their compliance with 
the GDPR to change and improve their corporate culture, resulting in greater trust among consumers. By 
going above and beyond legal requirements, . . . and advertising such measures to the public, they can gain a 
distinct trust-based competitive advantage over firms who minimally comply with the law.”). 
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GDPR compliance. In this context, contracts are important for ensuring 
compliance downstream. Security and transparency are important issues here 
that should be addressed in contracts.  
Furthermore, controllers should properly vet their processors and may 
audit them during processing. Provisions for the exercise of rights by data 
subjects must be evaluated and the use of metadata that may be easily indexed 
provides help in locating relevant data. Companies should exercise special 
care in negotiating and drafting cloud contracts. The increased sanctions in 
the GDPR, when compared to the 1995 Directive, provide incentive for 
compliance. 
Under the Privacy Shield there are various requirements regarding 
contracts for onward transfers. These should be perceived as part of global 
data flow supply chain management—a concept that harkens to other fields, 
such as CSR, where more and more companies are becoming responsible for 
their international supply chains. However, the result of efforts such as these 
will be to help the company better to govern its personal data flows, avoid 
liability, and increase trust among its customers, suppliers and partners. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Cross-border data flows are today an important component of 
international trade, and the backbone of many digital service models. 
However, for various reasons, in the context of “rival standards” and “rule 
overlap” of extra-territorial laws, restrictions on the transfer of personal data 
and data localizations requirements have sprung up. While these complexities 
have served to impede certain data flows, international agreements have been 
resorted to, in order to allow for continued free flows of personal data, subject 
to providing certain protections of data subjects and their data. These 
agreements have included the Privacy Shield, in the case of self-certified 
organizations located in the United States, an adequacy decision and 
Supplemental Rules, in the case of Japan, BCRs and standard contractual 
clauses in other cases––although some of these are subject to challenge in the 
courts. 
Parallel to the development of the concept of international supply chain 
management in other fields, such as for the production of products in 
corporate social responsibility, the GDPR, and the use of cross-border transfer 
mechanisms under it, demand certain actions for managing the international 
personal data supply chain. In the Privacy Shield we have seen that there are 
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requirements of accountability of U.S. Privacy Shield-certified organizations 
for onward data transfers. Accountability starts with knowing what data is 
being collected and processed and where it is. As has been shown, this is 
important because of the broad reach of data protection law, both in terms of 
subject matter and its extraterritorial reach. 
When recourse is made to processors (or subsequent controllers) down 
the data flow supply chain, contracts must be used to control activities, to 
ensure data protection is ensured and to frame any future possible onward 
transfers. This is true whether the contracts be used in a cloud service 
relationship, other forms of processing, or onward transfers under the Privacy 
Shield. 
Overlapping legislation in the area makes these activities more difficult, 
and it is imperative that companies constantly monitor legislative and judicial 
developments in this area. While this Article has focused solely on the GDPR 
and its predecessor, the 1995 Directive, it is important companies determine 
and analyze all applicable legislation, especially when compliance with the 
CCPA is similar, but not the same, as compliance with the GDPR. Companies 
must understand these complexities and follow regulatory developments 
wherever their global data flow supply chain goes—most likely, worldwide—
in order to ensure compliance. Although there may be conflicts among the 
various applicable data privacy legislation, good data governance should 
serve compliance efforts under all such legislation, giving increased 
justification for its practice. Companies should apply good data governance 
throughout their global data flow supply chain. 
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Annex—OECD Guidelines (1980 & 2013 Modernization)—Basic 
Principles of International Applications: Free Flow and 
Legitimate Restrictions 
Provision Original 1980 Guidelines 
Part III. 
 
Basic Principles of 
International Application: 
Free Flow and Legitimate 
Restrictions243 
2013 Modernization Text 
Part IV. 
 
Basic Principles of 
International Application: 




Implications for Other 
Member Countries of 
Domestic Processing 
and Re-export of 
Personal Data 
15. Member countries 
should take into 
consideration the 
implications for other 
Member countries of 
domestic processing and re-





Data Flows Are 
Uninterrupted and 
Secure 
16. Member countries 
should take all reasonable 
and appropriate steps to 
ensure that transborder 
flows of personal data, 
including transit through a 
Member country, are 





Regardless of Data 
Location 
 16. A data controller remains 
accountable for personal data 
under its control without 




243  OECD Guidelines (1980), supra note 135. 
244  OECD Privacy Framework (2013), supra note 136, at 16. 
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Provision Original 1980 Guidelines 
Part III. 
 
Basic Principles of 
International Application: 
Free Flow and Legitimate 
Restrictions243 
2013 Modernization Text 
Part IV. 
 
Basic Principles of 
International Application: 





Other Member Country 
Substantially Observes 
Guidelines 
17. A Member country 
should refrain from 
restricting transborder flows 
of personal data between 
itself and another Member 
country except where the 
latter does not yet 
substantially observe these 
Guidelines or where the re-
export of such data would 
circumvent its domestic 
privacy legislation. A 
Member country may also 
impose restrictions in 
respect of certain categories 
of personal data for which 
its domestic privacy 
legislation includes specific 
regulations in view of the 
nature of those data and for 
which the other Member 
country provides no 
equivalent protection. 
 
17. A Member country should 
refrain from restricting 
transborder flows of personal 
data between itself and 
another country where (a) the 
other country substantially 
observes these Guidelines or 
(b) sufficient safeguards exist, 
including effective 
enforcement mechanisms and 
appropriate measures put in 
place by the data controller, to 
ensure a continuing level of 
protection consistent with 
these Guidelines. 
Proportionality 18. Member countries 
should avoid developing 
laws, policies and practices 
in the name of the 
protection of privacy and 
individual liberties, which 
would create obstacles to 
transborder flows of 
personal data that would 
exceed requirements for 
such protection. 
 
18. Any restrictions to 
transborder flows of personal 
data should be proportionate 
to the risks presented, taking 
into account the sensitivity of 
the data, and the purpose and 
context of the processing. 
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